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Factors Affecting Lobbying: Illustrations From India

Author

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  • Pankaj K. P. Shreyaskar
  • Mrinalini Pandey
  • Pramod Pathak

Abstract

Lobbying, as has been reported occasionally in various public processes in the last few decades in India, is being practiced vociferously by most of the politico-economic actors, including by the most revered ones. Their actions, however, largely remain discreet and subdued. Accordingly, very few academic literatures explaining various modus operandi of lobbying in India, is available let alone setting up any model of interaction among the economic actors. Besides, the parameters relied upon by the lobbying actors to evolve an appropriate strategy to undertake lobbying action have not been studied in Indian context. It is imperative that the lobbying actors and their strategies would significantly differ among various nations depending upon their politico-economic settings, India is no exception. The present article aims to propose a conceptual model of interaction among the economic actors in the Indian context. Further, it also examines the rationale of pivotal Indian lobbying actors for relying upon the outside and inside lobbying strategies, which thus far was limited to the lobbyists of the US and the EU in the academic parlance. Besides, it also presents the strategies and tools of lobbying to garner influences in India.

Suggested Citation

  • Pankaj K. P. Shreyaskar & Mrinalini Pandey & Pramod Pathak, 2026. "Factors Affecting Lobbying: Illustrations From India," Vision, , vol. 30(1), pages 110-120, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:vision:v:30:y:2026:i:1:p:110-120
    DOI: 10.1177/09722629221092142
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    References listed on IDEAS

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