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The Corporate Context of Lobbying Activity

Author

Listed:
  • Brasher Holly

    (University of Alabama at Birmingham)

  • Lowery David

    (University of Leiden)

Abstract

Despite extensive research on political activity on the part of corporations, clear and consistent findings remain elusive. We identify three reasons for this failure. First, most of the empirical literature on corporate political activity simply studies the wrong phenomena by examining political action committees rather than lobbying more generally. Second, the literature studies an excessively narrow sample of organizations that might engage in lobbying, focusing almost always on extremely large corporations, which inevitably attenuates variance on many of the variables hypothesized to influence engagement in political activity. And third, prior work is rarely attentive to the diversity of corporate activities, narrowly conceptualizing vital aspects of the business context that might influence decisions to engage in political activity. Based on this critique, we develop and test new models of corporate political activity, finding that the diversity of the economic context within which firms work and firm size matter a great deal, if in ways somewhat different from those reported in prior work.

Suggested Citation

  • Brasher Holly & Lowery David, 2006. "The Corporate Context of Lobbying Activity," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-25, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:buspol:v:8:y:2006:i:1:n:1
    DOI: 10.2202/1469-3569.1124
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. M. Kabir Hassan & M. Sydul Karim & Tarun Mukherjee, 2023. "Does corporate diversification retrench the effects of firm‐level political risk?," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 58(4), pages 663-702, November.
    2. Adelino, Manuel & Dinc, I. Serdar, 2014. "Corporate distress and lobbying: Evidence from the Stimulus Act," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(2), pages 256-272.
    3. Panagiota Papadimitri & Ansgar Wohlschlegel, 2019. "Lobbying, Regulatory Enforcement and Corporate Governance: Theory and Evidence from Regulatory Enforcement Actions against US Banks," Working Papers in Economics & Finance 2019-08, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth Business School, Economics and Finance Subject Group.
    4. Mulligan, Emer & Oats, Lynne, 2016. "Tax professionals at work in Silicon Valley," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 63-76.
    5. Choi, Seong-jin & Jiménez, Alfredo & Lee, Jeoung Yul, 2020. "The impact of political capabilities and political markets on firms' decision to lobby," Journal of International Management, Elsevier, vol. 26(4).
    6. Lee, Jeoung Yul & Jiménez, Alfredo & Choi, Seong-jin & Choi, Yun Hyeong, 2022. "Ideological polarization and corporate lobbying activity: The contingent impact of corruption distance," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 448-461.
    7. Kim Jin-Hyuk, 2008. "Corporate Lobbying Revisited," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(2), pages 1-25, September.
    8. Philip Hersch & Jeffry Netter & Christopher Pope, 2008. "Do Campaign Contributions and Lobbying Expenditures by Firms Create “Political” Capital?," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 36(4), pages 395-405, December.
    9. Dellis, Konstantinos & Sondermann, David, 2017. "Lobbying in Europe: new firm-level evidence," Working Paper Series 2071, European Central Bank.
    10. Hui Chen & David Parsley & Ya-Wen Yang, 2015. "Corporate Lobbying and Firm Performance," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(3-4), pages 444-481, April.
    11. Woon Leong Lin, 2018. "Do Firm’s Organisational Slacks Influence the Relationship between Corporate Lobbying and Corporate Financial Performance? More Is Not Always Better," IJFS, MDPI, vol. 7(1), pages 1-23, December.
    12. Oliver Huwyler, 2020. "Interest groups in the European Union and their hiring of political consultancies," European Union Politics, , vol. 21(2), pages 333-354, June.
    13. José Carlos Marques, 2017. "Industry Business Associations: Self-Interested or Socially Conscious?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 143(4), pages 733-751, July.
    14. Lynn Bennie & Patrick Bernhagen & Neil J. Mitchell, 2007. "The Logic of Transnational Action: The Good Corporation and the Global Compact," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 55(4), pages 733-753, December.
    15. Panagiota Papadimitri & Ansgar Wohlschlegel, 2020. "Lobbying and Enforcement: Theory and Application to Bank Regulation," Working Papers 2020-01, Swansea University, School of Management.
    16. Brian Kelleher Richter & Krislert Samphantharak & Jeffrey F. Timmons, 2009. "Lobbying and Taxes," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(4), pages 893-909, October.
    17. Mohammad Badrul Muttakin & Dessalegn Getie Mihret & Tarek Rana, 2021. "Electoral system, corporate political donation, and carbon emission intensity: Cross‐country evidence," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(4), pages 1767-1779, May.
    18. Cao, Zhiyan & Fernando, Guy D. & Tripathy, Arindam & Upadhyay, Arun, 2018. "The economics of corporate lobbying," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 54-80.
    19. Patrick Bernhagen & Neil J. Mitchell, 2009. "The Determinants of Direct Corporate Lobbying in the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 10(2), pages 155-176, June.

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