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Do Campaign Contributions and Lobbying Expenditures by Firms Create “Political” Capital?

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  • Philip Hersch
  • Jeffry Netter
  • Christopher Pope

Abstract

We examine the relation between a firm’s campaign contributions and lobbying expenditures and its Tobin’s q. We follow other studies that use q to measure the value of the firm’s intangible capital (e.g., the value of advertising, R&D, or environmental performance). Researchers have found a positive and significant relation between intangible assets and q. If political capital exists, it is an intangible asset. However, we find little relation between q and political contributions, suggesting that campaign contributions may not have long term effects on political markets. This is consistent with the view that contributions are done by firms as a response to a short term opportunity not as a way of building long-term political capital. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2008

Suggested Citation

  • Philip Hersch & Jeffry Netter & Christopher Pope, 2008. "Do Campaign Contributions and Lobbying Expenditures by Firms Create “Political” Capital?," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 36(4), pages 395-405, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:36:y:2008:i:4:p:395-405
    DOI: 10.1007/s11293-008-9125-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hadani, Michael, 2012. "Institutional ownership monitoring and corporate political activity: Governance implications," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 65(7), pages 944-950.
    2. Magee, Stephen & Lee, Hak Loh & Lee, Hongshik, 2017. "Simple measures of endogenous free-riding in protectionist lobbies," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 324-333.
    3. Kim, Chansog (Francis) & Pantzalis, Christos & Chul Park, Jung, 2012. "Political geography and stock returns: The value and risk implications of proximity to political power," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 196-228.
    4. Rajwani, Tazeeb & Liedong, Tahiru Azaaviele, 2015. "Political activity and firm performance within nonmarket research: A review and international comparative assessment," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 273-283.
    5. Unsal, Omer & Hassan, M. Kabir & Zirek, Duygu, 2016. "Corporate lobbying, CEO political ideology and firm performance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 126-149.
    6. Hadani, Michael & Dahan, Nicolas M. & Doh, Jonathan P., 2015. "The CEO as chief political officer: Managerial discretion and corporate political activity," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 68(11), pages 2330-2337.
    7. Unsal, Omer & Kabir Hassan, M. & Zirek, Duygu, 2017. "Corporate lobbying and labor relations: Evidence from employee-level litigations," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 411-441.
    8. Brown Richard S., 2016. "How do firms compete in the non-market? The process of political capability building," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(3), pages 263-295, October.
    9. Richard Borghesi & Kiyoung Chang, 2015. "The determinants of effective corporate lobbying," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 39(3), pages 606-624, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political contributions; Lobbying expenditures; Tobin’s q ; Political capital; D21; D72; G30; G31; G38;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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