IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/zbw/espost/129492.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Determinants of Debt and (Private) Equity Financing : The Case of Young, Innovative SMEs from Germany

Author

Listed:
  • Schäfer, Dorothea
  • Werwatz, Axel
  • Zimmermann, Volker

Abstract

Financial theory creates a puzzle. Some authors argue that high-risk entrepreneurs choose debt contracts instead of equity contracts since risky but high returns are of relatively more value for a loan-financed firm. Conversely, authors who focus explicitly on start-up finance predict that entrepreneurs are the more likely to seek equity-like venture capital contracts, the more risky their projects are. Our paper is an initial step towards resolving this puzzle empirically. We present microeconometric evidence on the determinants of debt and equity financing in young and innovative SMEs. We pay special attention to the role of risk for the choice of the method of financing. Since risk is not directly observable we use different indicators for financial and project risk. It turns out that our data generally confirms the hypothesis that the probability that a young high-tech firm receives equity financing is an increasing function of the financial risk. With regard to the intrinsic project risk, our results are less conclusive, as some of our indicators of a risky project are found to have a negative effect on the likelihood to be financed by private equity.

Suggested Citation

  • Schäfer, Dorothea & Werwatz, Axel & Zimmermann, Volker, 2004. "The Determinants of Debt and (Private) Equity Financing : The Case of Young, Innovative SMEs from Germany," EconStor Open Access Articles, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, pages 225-248.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:espost:129492
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/129492/1/Sch%C3%A4fer_2004_Determinants-Debt-Private.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bester, Helmut, 1994. "The Role of Collateral in a Model of Debt Renegotiation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 26(1), pages 72-86, February.
    2. Engel, Dirk & Keilbach, Max, 2007. "Firm-level implications of early stage venture capital investment -- An empirical investigation," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 150-167, March.
    3. Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, 2002. "Small Business Credit Availability and Relationship Lending: The Importance of Bank Organisational Structure," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(477), pages 32-53, February.
    4. Besanko, David & Thakor, Anjan V, 1987. "Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(3), pages 671-689, October.
    5. Bester, Helmut, 1987. "The role of collateral in credit markets with imperfect information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 887-899, June.
    6. Laura Bottazzi & Marco Da Rin, 2002. "Venture capital in Europe and the financing of innovative companies," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 17(34), pages 229-270, April.
    7. Oliver Hart, 2001. "Financial Contracting," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(4), pages 1079-1100, December.
    8. W. Sauerbrei & P. Royston, 1999. "Building multivariable prognostic and diagnostic models: transformation of the predictors by using fractional polynomials," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 162(1), pages 71-94.
    9. Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, 1992. "An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(3), pages 473-494.
    10. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    11. Hellmann, Thomas & Stiglitz, Joseph, 2000. "Credit and equity rationing in markets with adverse selection," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 281-304, February.
    12. Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
    13. Douglas Gale & Martin Hellwig, 1985. "Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(4), pages 647-663.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Eleonora Bartoloni, 2013. "Capital structure and innovation: causality and determinants," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 40(1), pages 111-151, February.
    2. Mueller, Elisabeth & Zimmermann, Volker, 2006. "The Importance of Equity Finance for R&D Activity: Are There Differences Between Young and OldCompanies?," ZEW Discussion Papers 06-014, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    3. Dorothea Schäfer & Andreas Stephan & Jenniffer Solórzano Mosquera, 2017. "Family ownership: does it matter for funding and success of corporate innovations?," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 48(4), pages 931-951, April.
    4. repec:taf:indinn:v:24:y:2017:i:2:p:97-121 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Müller, Elisabeth & Zimmermann, Volker, 2006. "The Importance of Equity Finance for R&D Activity – Are There Differences Between Young and Old Companies?," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 111, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:espost:129492. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/zbwkide.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.