Multinational Investment Attraction: Principal-Agent Considerations
Government agencies are becoming increasingly involved in the process of providing investment supports to attract foreign direct investment (FDI).This paper focuses on the problem of how best to structure the investment supports. Five different types of investment supports are theoretically and empirically analysed. In each case the effect of the principal-agent relationships between the MNE investor and the agency charged with attracting FDI are assessed in the strategic context. Theoretical analysis suggests that in some cases, governments may prefer support schemes that appear to be more expensive, but have better incentive or risk-sharing implications. Empirical analysis suggests that MNE firm characteristics are related to the type of investment support package obtained.
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Volume (Year): 6 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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