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Tenure, promotion and performance: The career path of US ambassadors

Author

Listed:
  • Eric Arias

    (New York University)

  • Alastair Smith

    (New York University)

Abstract

The mission of diplomats have often been characterized as promoting peace while advancing national interests. Ambassadorial appointments are also portrayed as patronage, used as a reward for domestic political favors. Here, we develop an original database of the tenure of US ambassadors from sources at the US State Department to better understand the determinants of ambassadorial careers. We assess the tenure of both political appointees and career diplomats based on four factors: (1) Political factors, such as leader turnover in the US and the host nation; (2) Personal characteristics of the ambassador, such as age and gender; (3) Characteristics of the host nation such as population, wealth, trade and alignment with the US; and (4) Performance measures, such as improvements in economic, diplomatic and security relations. US Presidential turnover has the greatest effect on ambassadorial tenure, especially for political appointees. Performance measures have little impact on the tenure or future career prospects of ambassadors.

Suggested Citation

  • Eric Arias & Alastair Smith, 2018. "Tenure, promotion and performance: The career path of US ambassadors," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 77-103, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:13:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s11558-017-9277-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s11558-017-9277-0
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    Cited by:

    1. Magnus Lundgren & Kseniya Oksamytna & Vincenzo Bove, 2022. "Politics or Performance? Leadership Accountability in UN Peacekeeping," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 66(1), pages 32-60, January.
    2. Axel Dreher & Shu Yu, 2020. "The Alma Mater effect: Does foreign education of political leaders influence UNGA voting?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 185(1), pages 45-64, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    US ambassadors; Diplomatic relations; Tenure;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration
    • F5 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy
    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration

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