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Environmental decentralization, local governments’ environmental attention and environmental pollution: an empirical evidence from establishment of River Chief System in China

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Listed:
  • Qiang Li

    (Anhui University of Finance and Economics)

  • Youming Tang

    (Anhui University of Finance and Economics)

  • Wei Wei

    (Anhui University of Finance and Economics)

  • Wei Wei

    (Anhui University of Finance and Economics)

Abstract

The optimization of the environmental management system holds the key to environmental improvement. Despite extensive studies in the past years, it is still an open question whether environmental policies should be centrally enforced. Thus, this paper, based on clarifying the relationship between environmental decentralization (ED) and river chief system (RCS), will elucidate the theoretical mechanism of the impact of ED on environmental pollution from the perspective of local governments’ environmental attention (LGEA). In addition, based on the panel data of 108 cities in the Yangtze River Economic Belt from 2003 to 2018, it will take the establishment of RCS as a quasi-natural experiment to explore the effect of ED on environmental pollution and the mediating effect of LGEA with the difference-in-difference method. The results show that ED exerts a lagged effect on reducing environmental pollution, and the effect increases over time. In terms of heterogeneity, the effect of ED on environmental pollution is immediately negative, and the negative effect increases over time in cities with high fiscal decentralization, but the effect is immediately positive and the positive effect decreases over time in cities with low fiscal decentralization. Lastly, the test of mediating effect indicates that ED can ultimately reduce environmental pollution by raising LGEA. This paper provides a new perspective for understanding the impact of ED on emission reduction.

Suggested Citation

  • Qiang Li & Youming Tang & Wei Wei & Wei Wei, 2024. "Environmental decentralization, local governments’ environmental attention and environmental pollution: an empirical evidence from establishment of River Chief System in China," Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, Springer, vol. 26(12), pages 31147-31173, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:endesu:v:26:y:2024:i:12:d:10.1007_s10668-023-04424-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s10668-023-04424-1
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