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Regulatory Environmental Federalism

Author

Listed:
  • Bouwe R. Dijkstra
  • Per G. Fredriksson

    () (School of Economics and The Leverhulme Centre for Research on Globalisation and Economic Policy, University of Nottingham, Nottingham NG7 2RD, United Kingdom
    Department of Economics, University of Louisville, Louisville, Kentucky 40292)

Abstract

This survey encompasses multiple areas. The theoretical literature on environmental federalism continues to expand in areas such as capital competition and political economy. On the empirical side, emphasis is put on the existence of strategic interaction among states, the effects of President Reagan's decentralization of environmental policy, and possible free-riding behavior. Moreover, the European Union is currently conducting a major policy experiment with its emissions trading scheme, which has implications for policy making in federal systems.

Suggested Citation

  • Bouwe R. Dijkstra & Per G. Fredriksson, 2010. "Regulatory Environmental Federalism," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 319-339, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:anr:reseco:v:2:y:2010:p:319-339
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    File URL: http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-resource-040709-135112
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. repec:oup:renvpo:v:12:y:2018:i:1:p:92-112. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Sjöberg, Eric, 2016. "An empirical study of federal law versus local environmental enforcement," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 14-31.
    3. Masashi Yamamoto & Yuichiro Yoshida, 2012. "Does the NIMBY strategy really promote a self-interest?: Evidence from England's waste management policy," GRIPS Discussion Papers 12-13, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.
    4. repec:eee:ecolec:v:147:y:2018:i:c:p:253-263 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    capital competition; strategic interaction; political economy; free riding; institutions; emissions trading;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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