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Credibility and Independence of the World Anti-Doping Agency

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  • Nicolas Eber

    (LARGE, Université Robert Schuman, Strasbourg, France)

Abstract

This article argues that the antidoping policy faces a credibility problem very similar to that identified for the conduct of the monetary policy. Using a theoretical framework à la Barro-Gordon in which athletes form rational expectations about authorities’ effort against doping, the author shows that strong antidoping policies are not credible unless conducted by a completely independent World Anti-Doping Agency, provided that its president has either a very strong aversion to doping or a wage contract that incites him or her to implement the announced level of effort.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Eber, 2002. "Credibility and Independence of the World Anti-Doping Agency," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 3(1), pages 90-96, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jospec:v:3:y:2002:i:1:p:90-96
    DOI: 10.1177/1527002502003001006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    2. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
    3. Nicolas EBER & Jacques THÉPOT, 1999. "Doping in Sport and Competition Design," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 1999044, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    4. Edward J. Bird & Gert G. Wagner, 1997. "Sport as a Common Property Resource," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(6), pages 749-766, December.
    5. Bird, Edward J. & Wagner, Gert G., 1997. "Sport as a Common Property Resource: A Solution to the Dilemmas of Doping," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 41(6), pages 749-766.
    6. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Berno Buechel & Eike Emrich & Stefanie Pohlkamp, 2016. "Nobody’s Innocent," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 17(8), pages 767-789, December.
    2. Nicolas Eber, 2012. "Doping and Anti-doping Measures," Chapters, in: Wolfgang Maennig & Andrew Zimbalist (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Mega Sporting Events, chapter 12, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Toohey, Kristine & Beaton, Anthony, 2017. "International cross-sector social partnerships between sport and governments: The World Anti-Doping Agency," Sport Management Review, Elsevier, vol. 20(5), pages 483-496.
    4. Buechel, Berno & Emrich, Eike & Pohlkamp, Stefanie, 2013. "Nobody's innocent: the role of customers in the doping dilemma," MPRA Paper 44627, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Jean-François Bourg & Jean-Jacques Gouguet, 2010. "The Political Economy of Professional Sport," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 13177.
    6. Eike Emrich & Christian Pierdzioch, 2015. "A Note on the International Coordination of Antidoping Policies," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 16(3), pages 312-321, April.
    7. Roland Kirstein, 2014. "Doping, the Inspection Game, and Bayesian Enforcement," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 15(4), pages 385-409, August.
    8. Wladimir Andreff, 2006. "New Perspectives in Sports Economics: A European View," Working Papers 0605, International Association of Sports Economists;North American Association of Sports Economists.
    9. Wladimir Andreff, 2006. "New Perspectives in Sports Economics: The European View," IASE Conference Papers 0601, International Association of Sports Economists.

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