Credibility and Independence of the World Anti-doping Agency: A Barro-Gordin-Type Approach to Antidoping Policy
This article argues that the antidoping policy faces a credibility problem very similar to that identified for the conduct of the monetary policy. Using a theoretical framework a la Barro-Gordon in which athletes form rational expectations about authorities' effort against doping, the author shows that strong antidoping policies are not credible unless conducted by a completely independent World Anti-Doping Agency, provided that its president has either a very strong aversion to doping or a wage contract that incites him or her to implement the announced level of effort.
Volume (Year): 3 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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