The role of risk aversion in a sovereign default model of polarization and political instability
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Other versions of this item:
- Yasin Kursat Onder & Enes Sunel, 2019. "Online Appendix to "The role of risk aversion in a sovereign default model of polarization and political instability"," Online Appendices 18-455, Review of Economic Dynamics.
- Yasin Kursat Onder & Enes Sunel, 2019. "Code and data files for "The role of risk aversion in a sovereign default model of polarization and political instability"," Computer Codes 18-455, Review of Economic Dynamics.
References listed on IDEAS
- Cuadra, Gabriel & Sapriza, Horacio, 2008.
"Sovereign default, interest rates and political uncertainty in emerging markets,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 78-88, September.
- Gabriel Cuadra & Horacio Sapriza, 2006. "Sovereign Default, Interest Rates and Political Uncertainty in Emerging Markets," Working Papers 2006-02, Banco de México.
- Cristina Arellano, 2008.
"Default Risk and Income Fluctuations in Emerging Economies,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 690-712, June.
- Arellano, Cristina, 2008. "Default risk and income fluctuations in emerging economies," MPRA Paper 7867, University Library of Munich, Germany.
More about this item
KeywordsPolitical uncertainty; Polarization; Risk aversion; Default risk;
- F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
- F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
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