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The Banking Bailout of the Subprime Crisis: Size and Effects

Author

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  • Michele Fratianni

    () (Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Bloomington, Indiana (USA), Universit� Politecnica delle Marche and MoFiR, Ancona (Italy))

  • Francesco Marchionne

    () (Universit� Politecnica delle Marche and MoFiR, Ancona (Italy))

Abstract

This paper examines government policies aimed at rescuing banks from the effects of the great financial crisis of 2007-2009. To delimit the scope of the analysis, we concentrate on the fiscal side of interventions and ignore, by design, the monetary policy reaction to the crisis. The policy response to the subprime crisis started in earnest after Lehman's failure in mid September 2008, accelerated after February 2009, and has become very large by September 2009. Governments have relied on a portfolio of intervention tools, but the biggest commitments and outlays have been in the form of debt and asset guarantees, while purchases of bad assets have been very limited. We employ event study methodology to estimate the benefits of government interventions on banks and their shareholders. Announcements directed at the banking system as a whole (general) and at specific banks (specific) were priced by the markets as cumulative abnormal rates of return over the selected window periods. General announcements tend to be associated with positive cumulative abnormal returns and specific announcements with negative ones. General announcements exert cross-area spillovers but are perceived by the home-country banks as subsidies boosting the competitive advantage of foreign banks. Specific announcements exert spillovers on other banks. Our results are also sensitive to the information environment. Specific announcements tend to exert a positive impact on rates of return in the pre-crisis sub-period, when announcements are few and markets have relative confidence in the "normal" information flow. The opposite takes place in the turbulent crisis sub-period when announcements are the order of the day and markets mistrust the "normal" information flow. These results appear consistent with the observed reluctance of individual institutions to come forth with requests for public assistance.

Suggested Citation

  • Michele Fratianni & Francesco Marchionne, 2010. "The Banking Bailout of the Subprime Crisis: Size and Effects," PSL Quarterly Review, Economia civile, vol. 63(254), pages 187-233.
  • Handle: RePEc:psl:pslqrr:2010:32
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    File URL: http://ojs.uniroma1.it/index.php/PSLQuarterlyReview/article/view/9427/9322
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Carlo D'Ippoliti, 2013. "Introduzione: L'Unione Europea e' "mammona" (Introduction: A Pansy European Union)," Moneta e Credito, Economia civile, vol. 66(264), pages 377-395.
    2. Alessandro Roncaglia, 2010. "Economic policy dilemmas in front of the crisis," PSL Quarterly Review, Economia civile, vol. 63(254), pages 181-185.
    3. Jan Kregel, 2010. "Can a return to Glass-Steagall provide financial stability in the US financial system?," PSL Quarterly Review, Economia civile, vol. 63(252), pages 39-76.
    4. Dumitriu, Ramona & Stefanescu, Razvan, 2014. "Perspective ale ţintirii inflaţiei
      [Perspectives of the Inflation Targeting]
      ," MPRA Paper 52943, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 14 Jan 2014.
    5. Alessandro Roncaglia, 2010. "Confronting the financial crisis: surveillance and regulation," PSL Quarterly Review, Economia civile, vol. 63(255), pages 295-298.
    6. Fratianni, Michele & Marchionne, Francesco, 2013. "The banking bailout of the subprime crisis: Was the bang worth the buck?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 240-264.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    announcements; financial crisis; rescue plans; undercapitalization;

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • N20 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - General, International, or Comparative

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