Asymmetric information in managing agricultural production risk
The aim of the paper is to apply a theory of asymmetric information to managing production risk in agriculture. The second part of the paper is devoted to the tools for reducing the information asymmetry - parametric products (weather derivatives, index insurance). The results are based on empirical analyses published in scientific journals. The findings were consulted with specialists on agricultural insurance in the Czech Republic. The results indicate the existence of moral hazard and adverse selection in farmers' behaviour. The article is a theoretical basis for definition of weather derivatives in agriculture.
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Volume (Year): 2010 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Just, Richard E. & Calvin, Linda & Quiggin, John, 1993.
"Adverse Selection in Crop Insurance: Actuarial and Asymmetric Information Incentives,"
197809, University of Maryland, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
- Richard E. Just & Linda Calvin & John Quiggin, 1999. "Adverse Selection in Crop Insurance: Actuarial and Asymmetric Information Incentives," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 81(4), pages 834-849.
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- Rubinstein, Ariel & Yaari, Menahem E., 1983. "Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 74-97, June.
- Vedenov, Dmitry V. & Barnett, Barry J., 2004. "Efficiency of Weather Derivatives as Primary Crop Insurance Instruments," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 29(03), December.
- Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
- Goodwin, Barry K., 2000. "Instability And Risk In U.S. Agriculture," Journal of Agribusiness, Agricultural Economics Association of Georgia, vol. 18(1), March.
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