Asymmetric information in managing agricultural production risk
The aim of the paper is to apply a theory of asymmetric information to managing production risk in agriculture. The second part of the paper is devoted to the tools for reducing the information asymmetry - parametric products (weather derivatives, index insurance). The results are based on empirical analyses published in scientific journals. The findings were consulted with specialists on agricultural insurance in the Czech Republic. The results indicate the existence of moral hazard and adverse selection in farmers' behaviour. The article is a theoretical basis for definition of weather derivatives in agriculture.
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Volume (Year): 2010 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Michael J. Roberts & Nigel Key & Erik O'Donoghue, 2006. "Estimating the Extent of Moral Hazard in Crop Insurance Using Administrative Data ," Review of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 28(3), pages 381-390.
- Richard E. Just & Linda Calvin & John Quiggin, 1999.
"Adverse Selection in Crop Insurance: Actuarial and Asymmetric Information Incentives,"
American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 81(4), pages 834-849.
- Just, Richard E. & Calvin, Linda & Quiggin, John, 1993. "Adverse Selection in Crop Insurance: Actuarial and Asymmetric Information Incentives," Working Papers 197809, University of Maryland, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
- Goodwin, Barry K., 2000. "Instability And Risk In U.S. Agriculture," Journal of Agribusiness, Agricultural Economics Association of Georgia, vol. 18(1), March.
- Vedenov, Dmitry V. & Barnett, Barry J., 2004. "Efficiency of Weather Derivatives as Primary Crop Insurance Instruments," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 29(03), December.
- George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
- Rubinstein, Ariel & Yaari, Menahem E., 1983. "Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 74-97, June.
- Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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