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Sovereign default and the euro

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  • Karl Whelan

Abstract

The introduction of the euro meant that countries with sovereign debt problems could not use monetization and devaluation as a way to prevent default. The institutional structures of the euro were also widely thought to prevent a country in difficulties being bailed out by other euro members or having its sovereign debt purchased by the European Central Bank (ECB). Despite these restrictions, there was relatively little discussion about sovereign default in pre-Economic and Monetary Union debates among economists, and financial markets priced in almost no default risk in the pre-crisis years. The crisis has seen bailouts and bond purchases by the ECB but there has also been a sovereign default inside the euro and further defaults seem likely. The introduction of the euro was intended to bring greater stability by ending devaluations triggered by self-fulfilling runs on a currency. While this particular scenario can no longer happen, this paper discusses mechanisms whereby expectations that a country may leave the euro can lead to this outcome occurring. Copyright 2013, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Karl Whelan, 2013. "Sovereign default and the euro," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 29(3), pages 478-501, AUTUMN.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxford:v:29:y:2013:i:3:p:478-501
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/oxrep/grt041
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    Cited by:

    1. Sergio Cesaratto, 2014. "Balance of payments or monetary sovereignty? In search of the EMU’s original sin – a reply to Lavoie," a/ Working Papers Series 1406, Italian Association for the Study of Economic Asymmetries, Rome (Italy).
    2. Marek Louzek, 2023. "Is the Eurozone an Optimum Currency Area?," International Journal of Economic Sciences, European Research Center, vol. 12(2), pages 63-82, November.
    3. Aidan Regan, 2014. "What Explains Ireland’s Fragile Recovery from the Crisis? The Politics of Comparative Institutional Advantage," CESifo Forum, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 15(02), pages 26-31, April.
    4. Emmanuel CARRÉ & Frédérique FESTOC & Patricia LE MAITRE, 2025. "Quo Vadis regional monetary integration? Major trends in the optimum currency area literature over the last 60 years: A bibliometric approach," Region et Developpement, Region et Developpement, LEAD, Universite du Sud - Toulon Var, vol. 62, pages 67-98.
    5. Peter Spahn, 2013. "Competitiveness, Adjustment and Macroeconomic Risk Management in the Eurozone," ROME Working Papers 201316, ROME Network.
    6. Kliber, Agata & Płuciennik, Piotr, 2017. "Euro or not? Vulnerability of Czech and Slovak economies to regional and international turmoil," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 313-323.
    7. Peter Spahn, 2016. "Central Bank Design in a Non-optimal Currency Union A Lender of Last Resort for Government Debt?," ROME Working Papers 201610, ROME Network.
    8. Karl Whelan, 2022. "The past, present and future of euro area monetary-fiscal interactions," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 557-579, July.

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