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Competition policy in banking

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  • Xavier Vives

Abstract

This paper summarizes some of the arguments relating competition and banking instability, draws connections between regulation and competition policy, and surveys and analyses the role of competition policy in the banking sector in a financial crisis. It is argued that a trade-off between competition and stability is bound to persist despite improvements in regulation, that the banking sector specificity should be recognized by competition policy, and that competition policy and regulation need close coordination. Copyright 2011, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Xavier Vives, 2011. "Competition policy in banking," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 27(3), pages 479-497.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxford:v:27:y:2011:i:3:p:479-497
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/oxrep/grr021
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Fisher, Paul & Grout, Paul, 2017. "Competition and prudential regulation," Bank of England working papers 675, Bank of England.
    2. Gong, Di & Wagner, Wolf, 2016. "Systemic risk-taking at banks: Evidence from the pricing of syndicated loans," CEPR Discussion Papers 11150, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Gómez, Fabiana, 2015. "Failed bank takeovers and financial stability," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 16(C), pages 45-58.
    4. Lars Calmfors & Giancarlo Corsetti & John Hassler & Gilles Saint-Paul & Hans-Werner Sinn & Jan-Egbert Sturm & Ákos Valentinyi & Xavier Vives, 2012. "Chapter 3: Banking Regulation," EEAG Report on the European Economy, CESifo Group Munich, vol. 0, pages 83-98, February.
    5. Beck, Thorsten & De Jonghe, Olivier & Schepens, Glenn, 2013. "Bank competition and stability: Cross-country heterogeneity," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, pages 218-244.
    6. Vouldis, Angelos, 2015. "Credit market disequilibrium in Greece (2003-2011) - a Bayesian approach," Working Paper Series 1805, European Central Bank.
    7. Iftekhar Hasan & Matej Marinč, 2016. "Should competition policy in banking be amended during crises? Lessons from the EU," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 295-324, October.
    8. Xavier Vives, 2011. "Competition and Stability in Banking," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series,in: Luis Felipe Céspedes & Roberto Chang & Diego Saravia (ed.), Monetary Policy under Financial Turbulence, edition 1, volume 16, chapter 12, pages 455-502 Central Bank of Chile.
    9. Efthyvoulou, Georgios & Yildirim, Canan, 2014. "Market power in CEE banking sectors and the impact of the global financial crisis," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 11-27.
    10. Nicolas Véron & Morris Goldstein, 2011. "Too big to fail: the transatlantic debate," Working Papers 495, Bruegel.
    11. Elmas Yaldiz & Flavio Bazzana, 2010. "The effect of market power on bank risk taking in Turkey," Financial Theory and Practice, Institute of Public Finance, vol. 34(3), pages 297-314.
    12. Ashraf, Dawood & Rizwan, Muhammad Suhail & L’Huillier, Barbara, 2016. "A net stable funding ratio for Islamic banks and its impact on financial stability: An international investigation," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 47-57.
    13. repec:eee:finsta:v:33:y:2017:i:c:p:273-284 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. de Ramon, Sebastian & Francis, William & Milonas, Kristoffer, 2017. "An overview of the UK banking sector since the Basel Accord: insights from a new regulatory database," Bank of England working papers 652, Bank of England.
    15. Maghyereh, Aktham I. & Awartani, Basel, 2014. "Bank distress prediction: Empirical evidence from the Gulf Cooperation Council countries," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 126-147.
    16. Gheorghe Oprescu & Daniela Eleodor & Russell Damtoft, 2009. "The Real Economy and Competition Policy in Periods of Retrenchment," The AMFITEATRU ECONOMIC journal, Academy of Economic Studies - Bucharest, Romania, vol. 11(Number Sp), pages 722-734, November.
    17. repec:bla:jcmkts:v:55:y:2017:i:4:p:779-797 is not listed on IDEAS

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