Competition policy in banking
This paper summarizes some of the arguments relating competition and banking instability, draws connections between regulation and competition policy, and surveys and analyses the role of competition policy in the banking sector in a financial crisis. It is argued that a trade-off between competition and stability is bound to persist despite improvements in regulation, that the banking sector specificity should be recognized by competition policy, and that competition policy and regulation need close coordination. Copyright 2011, Oxford University Press.
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