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Intergenerational Redistribution and Labor Mobility: A Survey

  • Tim Krieger

Increasing labor mobility has an impact on all redistributive policy measures undertaken by national governments. This paper focuses on intergenerational redistribution, in particular PAYG financed public pension systems, and surveys some of the recent literature on this topic. One part of the literature chooses the perspective of a single country and investigates how labor mobility affects voting outcomes and the welfare of certain groups in society. A second strand of the literature addresses global efficiency issues and the harmonization of social policies in multi- jurisdictional settings.

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Article provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal FinanzArchiv.

Volume (Year): 58 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 339-

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Handle: RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(200207)58:3_339:iralma_2.0.tx_2-4
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.mohr.de/fa

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  1. Wilson, John Douglas, 1991. "Tax competition with interregional differences in factor endowments," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 423-451, November.
  2. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1990. "Tax harmonization and tax competition in Europe," Munich Reprints in Economics 19846, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  3. Kolmar, Martin, 1999. "Optimale Ansiedlung sozialpolitischer Entscheidungskompetenzen in der Europäischen Union," Beiträge zur Finanzwissenschaft, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, edition 1, volume 7, number urn:isbn:9783161471254.
  4. Bucovetsky, S., 1991. "Asymmetric tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 167-181, September.
  5. Friedrich Breyer & David Wildasin, 1993. "Steady-state welfare effects of social security in a large open economy," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 43-49, December.
  6. Razin, Assaf & Sadka, Efraim, 2000. " Unskilled Migration: A Burden or a Boon for the Welfare State?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 102(3), pages 463-79, June.
  7. von Hagen, Jürgen & Walz, Uwe, 1994. "Social Security and Migration in an Ageing Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 1022, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Kanbur, Ravi & Keen, Michael, 1993. "Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination When Countries Differ in Size," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 877-92, September.
  9. Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka, 2000. "Interactions between International Migration and the Welfare State," CESifo Working Paper Series 337, CESifo Group Munich.
  10. Konrad, Kai A, 1995. "Social Security and Strategic Inter-vivos Transfers of Social Capital," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 315-26, August.
  11. Friedrich Breyer & Klaus Stolte, 2001. "Demographic change, endogenous labor supply and the political feasibility of pension reform," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 409-424.
  12. Breyer, Friedrich & Craig, Ben, 1997. "Voting on social security: Evidence from OECD countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 705-724, December.
  13. Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka, 1998. "Migration and Pension," NBER Working Papers 6778, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Arjan Lejour & Harrie Verbon, 1996. "Capital mobility, wage bargaining, and social insurance policies in an economic union," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 495-513, October.
  15. Vaubel, Roland, 1994. "The public choice analysis of European integration: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 227-249, May.
  16. Goodspeed, Timothy J., 1998. "On the importance of public choice in migration models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 373-379, June.
  17. Feldstein, Martin S, 1974. "Social Security, Induced Retirement, and Aggregate Capital Accumulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(5), pages 905-26, Sept./Oct.
  18. Alexander Haupt & Wolfgang Peters, 2001. "Voting on Public Pensions With Hand and Feet: How Young Migrants Try to Escape From Gerontocracy," CESifo Working Paper Series 523, CESifo Group Munich.
  19. WILDASIN, David, . "Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition," CORE Discussion Papers RP -804, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  20. Torsten Persson, 1983. "Deficits and Intergenerational Welfare in Open Economies," NBER Working Papers 1083, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1991. "The Politics of 1992: Fiscal Policy and European Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 501, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  22. GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & VAN YPERSELE, Tanguy, 1994. "Social Protection and Political Competition," CORE Discussion Papers 1994057, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  23. CREMER, Helmuth & FOURGEAUD, Virginie & LEITE-MONTEIRO, Manuel & MARCHAND, Maurice, . "Mobility and redistribution: A survey," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1371, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  24. Browning, Edgar K, 1975. "Why the Social Insurance Budget Is Too Large in a Democracy," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 13(3), pages 373-88, September.
  25. Scholten, Ulrich & Thum, Marcel, 1996. " Public Pensions and Immigration Policy in a Democracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 87(3-4), pages 347-61, June.
  26. Mansoorian, Arman & Myers, Gordon M., 1993. "Attachment to home and efficient purchases of population in a fiscal externality economy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 117-132, August.
  27. Martin Kolmar, 1997. "Intergenerational redistribution in a small open economy with endogenous fertility," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 335-356.
  28. Breyer, Friedrich & Kolmar, Martin, 2002. "Are national pension systems efficient if labor is (im)perfectly mobile?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 347-374, March.
  29. Paul A. Samuelson, 1958. "An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest with or without the Social Contrivance of Money," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 66, pages 467.
  30. Stefan Homburg & Wolfram Richter, 1993. "Harmonizing public debt and public pension schemes in the European community," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 51-63, December.
  31. Ulrich Hange, 2000. "Unfunded Public Pension System in the Presence of Perfect Household Mobility," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 57(1), pages 77-, September.
  32. Razin, Assaf & Sadka, Efraim, 1999. "Migration and pension with international capital mobility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 141-150, October.
  33. Haupt, Alexander & Peters, Wolfgang, 1998. " Public Pensions and Voting on Immigration," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(3-4), pages 403-13, June.
  34. Verbon, Harrie A. A., 1990. "Social insurance and the free internal market," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 487-500.
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