Voting on social security: evidence from OECD countries
An examination of the subset of public choice models for Social Security that have empirical implications. The data, collected from OECD countries for the years 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1990, show that higher median voter age, greater income heterogeneity, similarity in family size, and variables that make a public pension program profitable are all associated with a larger program.
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