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Premium setting and bank behavior in a voluntary deposit insurance scheme

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  • Ting-Fang Chiang
  • E-Ching Wu
  • Min-Teh Yu

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  • Ting-Fang Chiang & E-Ching Wu & Min-Teh Yu, 2007. "Premium setting and bank behavior in a voluntary deposit insurance scheme," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 205-222, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:rqfnac:v:29:y:2007:i:2:p:205-222
    DOI: 10.1007/s11156-007-0029-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Darius Palia & Robert Porter, 2004. "The Impact of Capital Requirements and Managerial Compensation on Bank Charter Value," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 191-206, November.
    5. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
    6. J. Huston McCulloch & Min-Teh Yu, 1998. "Government Deposit Insurance and the Diamond-Dybvig Model," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 23(2), pages 139-149, December.
    7. Jacklin, Charles J & Bhattacharya, Sudipto, 1988. "Distinguishing Panics and Information-Based Bank Runs: Welfare and Policy Implications," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(3), pages 568-592, June.
    8. Edward J. Green & Ping Lin, 2000. "Diamond and Dybvig's classic theory of financial intermediation : what's missing?," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 3-13.
    9. Beck, Thorsten, 2002. "Deposit insurance as private club: is Germany a model?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(4), pages 701-719.
    10. Duan, Jin-Chuan & Yu, Min-Teh, 1999. "Capital standard, forbearance and deposit insurance pricing under GARCH," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(11), pages 1691-1706, November.
    11. Buser, Stephen A & Chen, Andrew H & Kane, Edward J, 1981. "Federal Deposit Insurance, Regulatory Policy, and Optimal Bank Capital," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 36(1), pages 51-60, March.
    12. Marcus, Alan J & Shaked, Israel, 1984. "The Valuation of FDIC Deposit Insurance Using Option-pricing Estimates," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 16(4), pages 446-460, November.
    13. John, Kose & John, Teresa A. & Senbet, Lemma W., 1991. "Risk-shifting incentives of depository institutions: A new perspective on federal deposit insurance reform," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(4-5), pages 895-915, September.
    14. Freeman, Scott, 1988. "Banking as the Provision of Liquidity," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 61(1), pages 45-64, January.
    15. Ronn, Ehud I & Verma, Avinash K, 1986. "Pricing Risk-Adjusted Deposit Insurance: An Option-Based Model," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 41(4), pages 871-895, September.
    16. Loewy, Michael B., 1991. "The macroeconomic effects of bank runs: An equilibrium analysis," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 242-256, June.
    17. Lee, Wai Sing & Kwok, Chuck C. Y., 2000. "Domestic and international practice of deposit insurance: a survey," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 29-62, January.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Nurdianawati Irwani Abdullah, 2012. "Applications of Malaysia Deposit Insurance Corporation (MDIC) To Takaful Operators: An Analysis from the Shariah Advisors’ Perspective," Information Management and Business Review, AMH International, vol. 4(12), pages 615-624.
    2. Dung Viet Tran & M. Kabir Hassan & Reza Houston, 2020. "Discretionary loan loss provision behavior in the US banking industry," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 605-645, August.
    3. Mohamed Wail Aaminou & Rajae Aboulaich, 2017. "Modeling Consumers’ Behavior in New Dual Banking Markets: The Case of Morocco," Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies (RPBFMP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 20(02), pages 1-24, June.
    4. Drehmann, Mathias & Tarashev, Nikola, 2013. "Measuring the systemic importance of interconnected banks," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 586-607.
    5. Bernard Bollen & Michael Skully & David Tripe & Xiaoting Wei, 2015. "The Global Financial Crisis and Its Impact on Australian Bank Risk," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 15(1), pages 89-111, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Deposit insurance; Insurance premium; Social welfare; Compulsory; Voluntary; Moral hazard; G20; G21; G28;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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