Optimal pricing and grant policies for museums
The “free access” policy designed by the British Government has encouraged interest in museum financial issues. We define a principal-agent model for museum administration where there are two income sources: public grants and ticket revenues. This model allows us to define the optimal contract determining public grants, ticket prices, budget and managerial effort. We find a theoretical explanation for the inelastic pricing strategy commonly adopted in cultural economics. We further find that museum manager should never have any control over the price of tickets. The model can also be applied to other institutions, such as schools or NGOs, which are able to raise funds directly from private (e.g., ticket revenues or membership fees) or public sources. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, B.V. 2006
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Frey, Bruno S, 1994. "Cultural Economics and Museum Behaviour," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 41(3), pages 325-35, August.
- Macho-Stadler, Ines & Perez-Castrillo, J. David, 2001.
"An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts,"
Oxford University Press,
edition 2, number 9780199243259.
- Macho-Stadler, Ines & Perez-Castrillo, J. David, 2001. "An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, edition 2, number 9780199243273.
- Juan Prieto-Rodríguez & Víctor Fernández-Blanco, 2006.
"Optimal pricing and grant policies for museums,"
Journal of Cultural Economics,
Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 169-181, December.
- Juan Prieto-Rodriguez & Victor Fernandez-Blanco, 2003. "Optimal Pricing And Grant Policies For Museums," Public Economics 0309002, EconWPA.
- Juan Prieto Rodríguez & Víctor Fernández Blanco, . "Optimal Pricing And Grant Policies For Museums," Working Papers 3-02 Classification-JEL :, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales.
- Bruno S. Frey & Stephan Meier, .
"The Economics of Museums,"
IEW - Working Papers
149, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Peter Johnson & Barry Thomas, 1998. "The Economics of Museums: A Research Perspective," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 75-85, June.
- William Luksetich & Mark Partridge, 1997. "Demand functions for museum services," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(12), pages 1553-1559.
- Adrian Darnell, 1998. "Some Simple Analytics of Access and Revenue Targets," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 189-196, June.
- Stephen Bailey & Peter Falconer, 1998. "Charging for Admission to Museums and Galleries: A Framework for Analysing the Impact on Access," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 167-177, June.
- David Maddison, 2004. "Causality and Museum Subsidies," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 89-108, May.
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521637121 is not listed on IDEAS
- David Maddison & Terry Foster, 2003. "Valuing congestion costs in the British Museum," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(1), pages 173-190, January.
- John W. O'Hagan, 1995. "National Museums: To Charge or not to charge?," Economics Policy Papers 952, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics.
- Daniel R. Marburger, 1997. "Optimal ticket pricing for performance goods," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(5), pages 375-381.
- Juan Gabriel Rodríguez & Rafael Salas, 2004. "A Bistochastic Nonparametric Estimator," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2004/22, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
- Jorge Onrubia & Rafael Salas & José Sanz, 2005. "Redistribution and labour supply," Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 109-124, August.
- Luis Ayala & Rosa Martínez & Jesús Ruiz Huerta, 2003. "Equivalence scales in tax and transfer policies," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 27(3), pages 593-614, September.
- Guesnerie, Roger & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1984. "A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 329-369, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:jculte:v:30:y:2006:i:3:p:169-181. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.