Some Simple Analytics of Access and Revenue Targets
If a museum faces a price inelastic demand and twin targets of a minimum number of visits and a minimum revenue, those targets need not be compatible. This paper explores the implications of such targets and shows that their compatibility depends critically on the admission price-elasticity. If the targets are incompatible it may be possible to engineer compatibility by shifting the demand curve. However, if the demand shift (eg resulting from advertising or improving the quality of the visitor experience) requires resourcing and is to be self-financing, it may or may not be possible to bring about compatibility. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998
Volume (Year): 22 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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- Faye Steiner, 1997. "Optimal Pricing of Museum Admission," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 21(4), pages 307-333, December.
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