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Innovation, imitation and policy inaction

Listed author(s):
  • Cerqueti, Roy
  • Quaranta, Anna Grazia
  • Ventura, Marco

The paper deals with the controversial issue of intellectual property rights. We deal with an optimization problem to model the optimal government's behavior in presence of dynamic uncertainty and intervention costs. More specifically, we search for the optimal strategies to be implemented by a policy maker to optimally balance the number of innovators and imitators. The problem is first tackled from a purely theoretical perspective and then by implementing extensive numerical simulations on the basis of empirical data. By the theoretical perspective, we obtain a rigorous proof that optimal strategies depend on the initial value of the number of imitators and not on the initial ratio between innovators and imitators, whereas the simulations provide us with intuitive insights from an economic point of view, along with a validation of the theoretical results. The results support the evidence that governments choose the possible widest bandwidth and minimize the size of interventions so as to curb intervention costs.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0040162516301081
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Technological Forecasting and Social Change.

Volume (Year): 111 (2016)
Issue (Month): C ()
Pages: 22-30

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Handle: RePEc:eee:tefoso:v:111:y:2016:i:c:p:22-30
DOI: 10.1016/j.techfore.2016.06.001
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00401625

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  1. Philippe Aghion & Nick Bloom & Richard Blundell & Rachel Griffith & Peter Howitt, 2005. "Competition and Innovation: an Inverted-U Relationship," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 120(2), pages 701-728.
  2. Furukawa, Yuichi, 2007. "The protection of intellectual property rights and endogenous growth: Is stronger always better?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(11), pages 3644-3670, November.
  3. Paul Belleflamme & Pierre M. Picard, 2007. "Piracy and Competition," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(2), pages 351-383, June.
  4. Yongyang Cai & Kenneth Judd & Greg Thain & Stephen Wright, 2015. "Solving Dynamic Programming Problems on a Computational Grid," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 45(2), pages 261-284, February.
  5. Frank M. Bass & Trichy V. Krishnan & Dipak C. Jain, 1994. "Why the Bass Model Fits without Decision Variables," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 13(3), pages 203-223.
  6. Fershtman, Chaim & Markovich, Sarit, 2010. "Patents, imitation and licensing in an asymmetric dynamic R&D race," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 113-126, March.
  7. Lanjouw, Jean O & Pakes, Ariel & Putnam, Jonathan, 1998. "How to Count Patents and Value Intellectual Property: The Uses of Patent Renewal and Application Data," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(4), pages 405-432, December.
  8. James Bessen & Eric Maskin, 2009. "Sequential innovation, patents, and imitation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(4), pages 611-635.
  9. Sohn, Soo Jeoung, 2008. "The Two Contrary Effects of Imitation," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 75-82, January.
  10. Baláž, Vladimír & Williams, Allan M., 2012. "Diffusion and competition of voice communication technologies in the Czech and Slovak Republics, 1948–2009," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 393-404.
  11. Chang, Byeong-Yun & Li, Xu & Kim, Yun Bae, 2014. "Performance comparison of two diffusion models in a saturated mobile phone market," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 41-48.
  12. Guidolin, Mariangela & Guseo, Renato, 2015. "Technological change in the U.S. music industry: Within-product, cross-product and churn effects between competing blockbusters," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 35-46.
  13. Cerqueti, Roy & Tramontana, Fabio & Ventura, Marco, 2015. "On the coexistence of innovators and imitators," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 90(PB), pages 487-496.
  14. Hui He & Zheng Liu, 2008. "Investment-Specific Technological Change, Skill Accumulation, and Wage Inequality," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(2), pages 314-334, April.
  15. Michele Boldrin & David Levine, 2002. "The Case Against Intellectual Property," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(2), pages 209-212, May.
  16. Roy Cerqueti, 2012. "Financing policies via stochastic control: a dynamic programming approach," Journal of Global Optimization, Springer, vol. 53(3), pages 539-561, July.
  17. Pollock, Rufus, 2006. "Innovation and Imitation with and without Intellectual Property Rights," MPRA Paper 5025, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 17 Jul 2007.
  18. Quaranta, Anna Grazia & Zaffaroni, Alberto, 2008. "Robust optimization of conditional value at risk and portfolio selection," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(10), pages 2046-2056, October.
  19. Denicolo, Vincenzo & Franzoni, Luigi Alberto, 2003. "The contract theory of patents," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 365-380, December.
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