Squatting, eviction and development
This paper explains both squatting and preemptive eviction by landowners within the context of incomplete land markets. The model shows that squatting is not inevitable in incomplete property markets; instead, it arises from optimal landowner decisions not to fully exercise property rights. The analysis explains why squatters' housing investments and owners' preemptive eviction rates tend to be higher than efficient and why eviction rates for open property are inefficiently high. It also examines informal land markets comprising potential squatters and owners and shows why they need not fully resolve inefficient squatter investment and landowner eviction decisions.
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- Hoy, Michael & Jimenez, Emmanuel, 1991.
"Squatters' Rights and Urban Development: An Economic Perspective,"
London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 58(229), pages 79-92, February.
- Hoy, M. & Jimenez, E., 1988. "Squatters' Right And Urban Development: An Economic Perspective," Working Papers 1988-14, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Dardanoni, Valentino, 1988. "Optimal Choices under Uncertainty: The Case of Two-Argument Utility Functions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(391), pages 429-50, June.
- Matthew Baker & Thomas Miceli & C. F. Sirmans & Geoffrey K. Turnbull, 2001. "Property Rights by Squatting: Land Ownership Risk and Adverse Possession Statutes," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 77(3), pages 360-370.
- de Meza, David & Gould, J R, 1992. "The Social Efficiency of Private Decisions to Enforce Property Rights," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 561-80, June.
- Jimenez, Emmanuel, 1985. "Urban squatting and community organization in developing countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 69-92, June.
- Turnbull, Geoffrey K., 1994. "Location and housing demand with endogenous consumption risk," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(5), pages 543-563, October.
- Miceli, Thomas J. & Sirmans, C. F., 1995. "An economic theory of adverse possession," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 161-173, June.
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