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Voters’ influence on local tax policy

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  • Allers, Maarten
  • Rienks, Harm

Abstract

In a well-functioning democracy, citizens can influence public policy through voting. By voting prospectively, voters may aim to select politicians that make policies in line with their preferences, and, by voting retrospectively, they may reward or punish politicians for their performance. To what extent voters actually influence policy is unclear, especially in local government, where many impediments to policy responsiveness may exist. Moreover, voters may realize that their influence on public policy is negligible and vote expressively instead of instrumentally. We investigate a key area in public policy, tax policy, using panel data on municipalities in the Netherlands in the period 1998–2021. We find that changes in the political color of the municipal council on average do not lead to changes in tax levels or tax distribution. However, incumbents that lower taxes fare better at the polls than incumbents that moderately increase taxes. Interestingly, strong tax increases do not lead to more severe electoral punishment, and punishment does not seem to differ between left-wing and right-wing incumbents. Our results suggest that expressive voting plays an important role. People may vote left-wing and express their identity as charitable persons, and then punish incumbents who actually raise taxes.

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  • Allers, Maarten & Rienks, Harm, 2024. "Voters’ influence on local tax policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:85:y:2024:i:c:s0176268024000776
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102575
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