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The political economy of education: Politician criminality and higher education institutions

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  • Kukreja, Rolly

Abstract

This paper establishes the links between politician criminality and higher education provision by studying the causal impact of electing leaders with accusations of serious crimes on the opening of new publicly funded colleges in India. Using a regression discontinuity design with close elections between candidates accused of serious crimes and candidates not accused of serious crimes, I show that constituencies represented by state legislature members accused of serious crimes are less likely to witness openings of new state government funded colleges. Further, this effect is not compensated by openings of new private colleges. This negative impact is higher for constituencies with representatives aligned with the party governing at the state level, confirming the notion that access to power is essential for the ability to influence provision of higher education institutes. Finally, this study provides suggestive evidence that such lower provision of state government colleges is most likely to impact the lowest income groups in society.

Suggested Citation

  • Kukreja, Rolly, 2024. "The political economy of education: Politician criminality and higher education institutions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:85:y:2024:i:c:s0176268024000570
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102555
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Higher education institutions; Criminal politicians; Close elections;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
    • I23 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Higher Education; Research Institutions

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