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Patronage and ideology in electoral behavior: Evidence from Egypt's first presidential elections

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  • Al-Ississ, Mohamad
  • Atallah, Samer

Abstract

This paper investigates the impact of patronage and ideology on voter behavior and election outcomes. Egypt's first free presidential elections represent a good case study to answer the question whether private gain outweighs ideology in voter behavior on a broader level. First, we combine election results with household surveys and national statistics to estimate the impact of patronage (measured by public employment) on voting for the pre-revolution regime candidate. Second, using results of the first round of elections as a proxy for ideology, we test for the effect of ideological preferences on voting behavior. Additionally, we test for candidates' ability to mobilize supporters. Our results suggest that patronage has a stronger effect than secularist ideology but a weaker effect than pro-change ideology. Results show that the number of public sector and government employees in each electoral district has a positive impact on participation rates.

Suggested Citation

  • Al-Ississ, Mohamad & Atallah, Samer, 2015. "Patronage and ideology in electoral behavior: Evidence from Egypt's first presidential elections," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 241-248.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:37:y:2015:i:c:p:241-248
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.10.002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Hillman, Arye L. & Metsuyanim, Kfir & Potrafke, Niklas, 2015. "Democracy with group identity," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 274-287.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Egypt; Voting; Patronage; Ideology;

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy
    • P48 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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