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Why EMU is not a failure

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  • Grüner, Hans Peter

Abstract

About a decade ago, papers by Grüner and Hefeker (1999) and Cukierman and Lippi (2001) predicted that European Monetary Union may lead to higher inflation and unemployment in some participating countries. Meanwhile, we know that these predictions have not come true. The present paper develops a model of trade union behavior that explains why EMU was more successful than we predicted. The paper also sheds new light on the macroeconomic role of central bank flexibility.

Suggested Citation

  • Grüner, Hans Peter, 2010. "Why EMU is not a failure," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-11, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:26:y:2010:i:1:p:1-11
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    Cited by:

    1. Merkl, Christian & Schmitz, Tom, 2011. "Macroeconomic volatilities and the labor market: First results from the euro experiment," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 44-60, March.
    2. Mikosch, Heiner & Sturm, Jan-Egbert, 2012. "Has the EMU reduced wage growth and unemployment? Testing a model of trade union behavior," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 27-37.
    3. Ahmet Sensoy & Duc Khuong Nguyen & Ahmed Rostom & Erk Hacihasanoglu, 2019. "Dynamic integration and network structure of the EMU sovereign bond markets," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 281(1), pages 297-314, October.
    4. Sensoy, Ahmet & Hacihasanoglu, Erk & Rostom, Ahmed, 2015. "European economic and monetary union sovereign debt markets," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7149, The World Bank.

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