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The effects of uncertainty about countries’ compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact

  • Ferré, Montserrat

The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was established to govern discretionary fiscal policy in the European Monetary Union. This article studies the effects created when there is uncertainty about the members’ commitment to respecting the established deficit limits in the SGP. We will show that, even if countries respect the SGP deficit ceiling, the presence of uncertainty about their compliance will bring about higher volatility in key economic variables, which could, in turn, affect unemployment and growth negatively. This finding shows that it is important to reduce uncertainty about the members’ commitment towards the SGP.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Policy Modeling.

Volume (Year): 34 (2012)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
Pages: 660-674

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jpolmo:v:34:y:2012:i:5:p:660-674
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505735

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