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Information systems outsourcing projects as a double moral hazard problem

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  • Elitzur, Ramy
  • Gavious, Arieh
  • Wensley, Anthony K.P.

Abstract

In the past two decades many organizations have turned to other organizations to satisfy their information systems needs. Information systems outsourcing arrangements cover the spectrum from agreements involving the delivery of all information services to those providing specific services such as systems development, communications management, desktop computing provision and maintenance, and so on.

Suggested Citation

  • Elitzur, Ramy & Gavious, Arieh & Wensley, Anthony K.P., 2012. "Information systems outsourcing projects as a double moral hazard problem," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 379-389.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jomega:v:40:y:2012:i:3:p:379-389
    DOI: 10.1016/j.omega.2011.06.005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Xun Liu & Sen Lin & Lixing Liu & Fei Qian & Kun Zhang, 2020. "Exploring the Factors Triggering Occupational Ethics Risk of Technology Transaction in Chinese Construction Industry," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 17(4), pages 1-18, February.
    2. Jae-Nam Lee & Minh Q. Huynh & Rudy Hirschheim, 2008. "An integrative model of trust on IT outsourcing: Examining a bilateral perspective," Information Systems Frontiers, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 145-163, April.
    3. Zhang, Manman & Zhang, Juliang & Sun, Yue & Cheng, T.C.E., 2022. "How to outsource production considering quality management: Turnkey or buy-sell?," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
    4. Lu, Qinan & Du, Xiaodong, 2020. "The Outsourcing Choice of Agricultural Production Tasks: Implications for Food Security - A Multiple-task Based Approach," 2020 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, Kansas City, Missouri 304333, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    5. Balachandran, Kashi R. & Wang, Hsiao-Wen & Li, Shu-Hsing & Wang, Taychang, 2013. "In-house capability and supply chain decisions," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 473-484.
    6. Yu, Xinning & Lan, Yanfei & Zhao, Ruiqing, 2018. "Cooperation royalty contract design in research and development alliances: Help vs. knowledge-sharing," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 268(2), pages 740-754.
    7. Zhang, Yanfen & Xu, Qi & Zhang, Guoqing, 2023. "Optimal contracts with moral hazard and adverse selection in a live streaming commerce market," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).

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