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FHA loan performance and adverse selection in mortgage insurance

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  • Park, Kevin A.

Abstract

Using propensity score matching and survival analysis, we examine the performance of FHA- and privately-insured home purchase mortgages relative to uninsured mortgages. Privately-insured loans are more likely to default than uninsured loans with comparable risk characteristics, indicating the presence of adverse selection. By contrast, loans insured by FHA are not more likely to default than similar uninsured loans. Hazard ratios for both insurance types fall when an adjusted rate spread variable, but does not eliminate the disparity between uninsured and privately-insured loans. On the other hand, privately-insured loans are less likely to prepay while FHA-insured loans are more likely to prepay relative to uninsured loans.

Suggested Citation

  • Park, Kevin A., 2016. "FHA loan performance and adverse selection in mortgage insurance," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 82-97.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jhouse:v:34:y:2016:i:c:p:82-97
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jhe.2016.07.004
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    2. Calani, Mauricio & Paillacar, Manuel, 2022. "The pass-through of loan-loss-provisioning on mortgage lending: Evidence from a regulatory change," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 135(C).
    3. Bocchio, Cecilia & Crook, Jonathan & Andreeva, Galina, 2023. "The impact of macroeconomic scenarios on recurrent delinquency: A stress testing framework of multi-state models for mortgages," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 1655-1677.
    4. James A Kahn & Benjamin S Kay, 2020. "The impact of credit risk mispricing on mortgage lending during the subprime boom," BIS Working Papers 875, Bank for International Settlements.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mortgage; Default; Insurance; Federal Housing Administration; Adverse selection;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • R3 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location
    • R38 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Government Policy
    • R51 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Finance in Urban and Rural Economies
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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