Market interactions between aquaculture and common-property fisheries: Recent evidence from the Bristol Bay sockeye salmon fishery in Alaska
The remarkable growth of the global salmon aquaculture industry has generated important implications for Alaskan salmon fisheries as increased supplies of farmed product have led to declines in prices of both farmed and wild species. In the particular case of Bristol Bay sockeye salmon, falling prices and declining profit margins have led to reduced participation in the limited-entry fishery. This study conducts a formal examination of market interactions between the aquaculture and commercial fishery sectors by adapting the Homans and Wilen (1997) model of regulated open access to the context of restricted access fisheries. The econometric model reveals that limited entry regulations were initially successful in extracting rents from the Bristol Bay fishery; however, these rents were gradually dissipated as a result of overcapacity and the effect of falling ex-vessel prices. The emergence of aquaculture provides a strong rationale in favor of right-based approaches to fisheries management in Alaska.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521623940 is not listed on IDEAS
- Homans, Frances R. & Wilen, James E., 2005. "Markets and rent dissipation in regulated open access fisheries," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 381-404, March.
- Deacon, Robert T & Parker, Dominic P. & Costello, Christopher J, 2008. "Improving Efficiency by Assigning Harvest Rights to Fishery Cooperatives: Evidence From the Chignik Salmon Co-op," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt1cv9s0v9, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
- Frank Asche & Atle G. Guttormsen & Tom Sebulonsen & Elin H. Sissener, 2005. "Competition between farmed and wild salmon: the Japanese salmon market," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 33(3), pages 333-340, November.
- H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62, pages 124.
- Munro, Gordon R. & Scott, Anthony D., 1985. "The economics of fisheries management," Handbook of Natural Resource and Energy Economics, in: A. V. Kneese† & J. L. Sweeney (ed.), Handbook of Natural Resource and Energy Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 14, pages 623-676 Elsevier.
- Mark L. Herrmann & Ron C. Mittelhammer & Biing-Hwan Lin, 1993. "Import Demands for Norwegian Farmed Atlantic Salmon and Wild Pacific Salmon in North America, Japan and the EC," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 41(1), pages 111-125, 03.
- Homans, Frances R. & Wilen, James E., 1997. "A Model of Regulated Open Access Resource Use," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 1-21, January.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:59:y:2010:i:2:p:115-128. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shamier, Wendy)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.