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Improving Efficiency by Assigning Harvest Rights to Fishery Cooperatives: Evidence From the Chignik Salmon Co-op

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  • Deacon, Robert T
  • Parker, Dominic P.
  • Costello, Christopher J

Abstract

During 2002-2004 a voluntary, profit sharing harvesters' co-operative was allowed to operate in the Chignik Salmon fishery in Alaska. Regulators split the fishery's total allowable catch between the co-op and independent harvesters. Our economic model predicts that the co-op would centrally coordinate its members' activities, resulting in more efficient effort deployment than in the independent fleet. Empirical analysis of relevant data supports these predictions. We find that, in contrast to the independent fleet, the co-op concentrated effort among its most efficient members, fished closer to port, spread harvesting over a longer time span, and shared information on stock locations.

Suggested Citation

  • Deacon, Robert T & Parker, Dominic P. & Costello, Christopher J, 2008. "Improving Efficiency by Assigning Harvest Rights to Fishery Cooperatives: Evidence From the Chignik Salmon Co-op," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt1cv9s0v9, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:qt1cv9s0v9
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Octavio Aburto-Oropeza & Heather M. Leslie & Austen Mack-Crane & Sriniketh Nagavarapu & Sheila M.W. Reddy & Leila Sievanen, 2017. "Property Rights for Fishing Cooperatives: How (and How Well) Do They Work?," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 31(2), pages 295-328.
    2. Terry L. Anderson & Ragnar Arnason & Gary D. Libecap, 2010. "Efficiency Advantages of Grandfathering in Rights-Based Fisheries Management," NBER Working Papers 16519, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Coglan, Louisa & Pascoe, Sean, 2015. "Corporate-cooperative management of fisheries: A potential alternative governance structure for low value small fisheries?," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 27-35.
    4. Xepapadeas, Petros, 2023. "Multi-agent, multi-site resource allocation under quotas with a Stackelberg leader and network externalities," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).
    5. Gary D. Libecap & Terry L. Anderson, 2009. "The Allocation and Dissipation of Resource Rents: Implications for Fishery Reform," ICER Working Papers 13-2009, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
    6. Kathleen Segerson, 2013. "Voluntary Approaches to Environmental Protection and Resource Management," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 5(1), pages 161-180, June.
    7. Rong Zhou & Kathleen Segerson, 2016. "Individual vs. Collective Approaches to Fisheries Management," Marine Resource Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(2), pages 165-192.
    8. Liu, Jing & Qin, Tianbao, 2018. "A Comparative Analysis of Fishing Rights From a Transaction Cost Perspective," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 89-99.
    9. Lawson-Remer, Terra, 2013. "Do Stronger Collective Property Rights Improve Household Welfare? Evidence from a Field Study in Fiji," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 207-225.
    10. Deacon, Robert T & Costello, Christopher J & Parker, Dominic P, 2008. "A Model of Fishery Harvests with a Voluntary Co-op," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt5hf9269r, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
    11. Zhou, Rong & Segerson, Kathleen, 2014. "Individual vs. Collective Quotas in Fisheries Management: Efficiency and Distributional Impacts," 2014 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2014, Minneapolis, Minnesota 170601, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    12. Kaffine Daniel T & Costello Christopher, 2011. "Unitization of Spatially Connected Renewable Resources," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-31, March.
    13. Robert T. Deacon & Dominic P. Parker & Christopher Costello, 2013. "Reforming Fisheries: Lessons from a Self-Selected Cooperative," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(1), pages 83-125.
    14. Bennett, Abigail & Basurto, Xavier, 2018. "Local Institutional Responses to Global Market Pressures: The Sea Cucumber Trade in Yucatán, Mexico," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 57-70.
    15. Aburto-Oropeza,Octavio & Leslie,Heather M. & Mack-Crane,Austen & Nagavarapu,Sriniketh Suryasesha & Reddy,Sheila M.W. & Sievanen,Leila, 2016. "Property rights for fishing cooperatives : how (and how well) do they work ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7662, The World Bank.
    16. Kanjilal Kiriti & Muñoz-García Félix, 2020. "Endogenous Equity Shares in Cournot Competition: Welfare Analysis and Policy," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 1-21, January.
    17. Valderrama, Diego & Anderson, James L., 2010. "Market interactions between aquaculture and common-property fisheries: Recent evidence from the Bristol Bay sockeye salmon fishery in Alaska," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 115-128, March.
    18. Robert T. Deacon & Dominic P. Parker & Christopher Costello, 2010. "Overcoming the common pool problem through voluntary cooperation: the rise and fall of a fishery cooperative," NBER Working Papers 16339, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Christopher M. Anderson & Hirotsugu Uchida, 2014. "An Experimental Examination Of Fisheries With Concurrent Common Pool And Individual Quota Management," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 52(2), pages 900-913, April.

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