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Individual vs. Collective Approaches to Fisheries Management

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  • Rong Zhou
  • Kathleen Segerson

Abstract

This article presents an economic model of the efficiency and industry impacts of individual vs. collective approaches to rights-based management in fisheries. Key features of the model are the inclusion of uncertainty and an optimally designed mechanism for paying penalties or buying additional quota when harvests exceed allowances. Contrary to what might be expected, we find that a risk pooling mechanism (through either collective quotas or ITQs) does not necessarily reduce the probability of quota overages. We also show that for arbitrary penalties, the incentive effects faced by harvesters differ under the various approaches. The ability of regulators to optimally adjust the enforcement mechanism (here the quota price) plays a critical role in determining the efficiency of the different approaches. Finally, the optimal quota prices and the conditions that trigger them differ across the approaches; hence the impacts on expected profits differ as well.

Suggested Citation

  • Rong Zhou & Kathleen Segerson, 2016. "Individual vs. Collective Approaches to Fisheries Management," Marine Resource Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(2), pages 165-192.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:mresec:doi:10.1086/685384
    DOI: 10.1086/685384
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    Cited by:

    1. Hubert Stahn, 2025. "Voluntary management of fisheries under the threat of uncertain legislation," AMSE Working Papers 2501, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
    2. Juan Rosas-Munoz & José Antonio Carrillo-Viramontes, 2022. "Abundance of Resources and Incentives for Collusion in Fisheries," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(22), pages 1-20, November.
    3. Francois Bareille & Matteo Zavalloni & Meri Raggi & Davide Viaggi, 2021. "Cooperative Management of Ecosystem Services: Coalition Formation, Landscape Structure and Policies," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 79(2), pages 323-356, June.
    4. Yuru He & Shuolin Huang & Yi Tang, 2022. "Sustainable Practicalities towards Good Governance in Fish Townships and Villages by Ethics-Based Approach," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(12), pages 1-17, June.
    5. Matthew Kotchen & Kathleen Segerson, 2020. "The Use of Group-Level Approaches to Environmental and Natural Resource Policy," NBER Working Papers 27142, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Rosas-Munoz, Juan & Espinola-Arredondo, Ana & Munoz-Garcia, Felix, 2024. "When should the regulator be left alone in the commons? How fishing cooperatives can help ameliorate inefficiencies," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    7. Xepapadeas, Petros, 2023. "Multi-agent, multi-site resource allocation under quotas with a Stackelberg leader and network externalities," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).
    8. Rosas-Munoz, Juan & Espinola-Arredondo, Ana & Munoz-Garcia, Felix, 2022. "Don't Leave the Regulator Alone in the Commons: How Fishing Cooperatives Can Help Ameliorate Inefficiencies," Working Papers 2022-1, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.

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