IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/gam/jsusta/v14y2022i22p15083-d972600.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Abundance of Resources and Incentives for Collusion in Fisheries

Author

Listed:
  • Juan Rosas-Munoz

    (Departamento de Economía y Finanzas, Universidad del Bío-Bío, Concepcion 4030000, Chile
    Environment for Development (EfD), Concepcion 4030000, Chile
    These authors contributed equally to this work.)

  • José Antonio Carrillo-Viramontes

    (Departamento de Economía y Finanzas, Universidad de Guanajuato, Guanajuato 36050, Mexico
    These authors contributed equally to this work.)

Abstract

The aim of this study is to explore theoretically the circumstances in which collusion can emerge between artisanal organizations and external agents. We also analyze theoretically how collusion can alter the sustainability equilibria of marine resources. In situations of incomplete information where external agents are not aware of the initial stock of resources, we observe how those agents decide whether to accept or reject offers of collusion from artisanal organizations. We find that collusion is more likely to occur when the resource is abundant than when resources are scarce, as in the latter case, the external consultant has to be more careful with the established quota so as not to deplete the resource. Further, we find that organizations are more impatient in proposing collusion when the resources are scarce.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan Rosas-Munoz & José Antonio Carrillo-Viramontes, 2022. "Abundance of Resources and Incentives for Collusion in Fisheries," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(22), pages 1-20, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:14:y:2022:i:22:p:15083-:d:972600
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/14/22/15083/pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/14/22/15083/
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Yifei Yan & Adam Graycar, 2020. "Exploring corruption in fisheries," Natural Resources Forum, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(2), pages 176-190, May.
    2. Chenyang Xu & Klaas van’t Veld, 2020. "Team Inspection in the Management of Common-Pool Resources When Corruption is Present," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 75(3), pages 553-584, March.
    3. Kolstad, Ivar & Søreide, Tina, 2009. "Corruption in natural resource management: Implications for policy makers," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 214-226, December.
    4. Robert T. Deacon, 2012. "Fishery Management by Harvester Cooperatives," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 6(2), pages 258-277, July.
    5. Lee G. Anderson & Dwight R. Lee, 1986. "Optimal Governing Instrument, Operation Level, and Enforcement in Natural Resource Regulation: The Case of the Fishery," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 68(3), pages 678-690.
    6. Julio Peña-Torres & Roberto Muñoz & Felipe Quezada, 2022. "Entry Deterrence and Collusion at Repeated Multiunit Auctions of ITQs," Marine Resource Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(4), pages 437-465.
    7. Rong Zhou & Kathleen Segerson, 2016. "Individual vs. Collective Approaches to Fisheries Management," Marine Resource Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(2), pages 165-192.
    8. Edella Schlager & Elinor Ostrom, 1992. "Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 68(3), pages 249-262.
    9. Casas, Agustín & Díaz, Guillermo & Trindade, André, 2017. "Who monitors the monitor? Effect of party observers on electoral outcomes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 136-149.
    10. Jean-Marie Baland & Jean-Philippe Platteau, 1998. "Division of the Commons: A Partial Assessment of the New Institutional Economics of Land Rights," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 80(3), pages 644-650.
    11. Inoue, Kotaro & Kato, Hideaki Kiyoshi & Bremer, Marc, 2008. "Corporate restructuring in Japan: Who monitors the monitor?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(12), pages 2628-2635, December.
    12. Elisabeth Thuestad Isaksen & Andries Richter, 2019. "Tragedy, Property Rights, and the Commons: Investigating the Causal Relationship from Institutions to Ecosystem Collapse," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 6(4), pages 741-781.
    13. Gelcich, Stefan & Edwards-Jones, Gareth & Kaiser, Michel J., 2007. "Heterogeneity in fishers' harvesting decisions under a marine territorial user rights policy," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2-3), pages 246-254, March.
    14. Milliman, Scott R., 1986. "Optimal fishery management in the presence of illegal activity," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 363-381, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Call, Isabel L. & Lew, Daniel K., 2015. "Tradable permit programs: What are the lessons for the new Alaska halibut catch sharing plan?," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 125-137.
    2. Nøstbakken, Linda, 2008. "Fisheries law enforcement--A survey of the economic literature," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 293-300, May.
    3. Mwangi, Esther, 2006. "Subdividing the commons: the politics of property rights transformation in Kenya's Maasailand," CAPRi working papers 46, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    4. Paul C. Missios, 2004. "Wildlife trade and endangered species protection," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 48(4), pages 613-627, December.
    5. Xepapadeas, Petros, 2023. "Multi-agent, multi-site resource allocation under quotas with a Stackelberg leader and network externalities," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).
    6. Mwangi, Esther, 2007. "Subdividing the Commons: Distributional Conflict in the Transition from Collective to Individual Property Rights in Kenya's Maasailand," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 815-834, May.
    7. Hook, Andrew, 2019. "Fluid formalities: Insights on small-scale gold mining dynamics, informal practices, and mining governance in Guyana," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 324-338.
    8. Milligan, Ben & O'Keeffe, Michelle, 2019. "Global Governance of Resources and Implications for Resource Efficiency in Europe," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 46-58.
    9. Lars Hansen & Frank Jensen & Linda Nøstbakken, 2014. "Quota Enforcement in Resource Industries: Self-Reporting and Differentiated Inspections," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 58(4), pages 539-562, August.
    10. Damania, Richard & Bulte, Erwin H., 2006. "Renewable resource regulation and uncertain prices: The role of financial structure and bankruptcy," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 41-53, January.
    11. Joel Kincaid, 2004. "A note on some determinants of property rights in U.S. marine fisheries," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 17(6), pages 1-11.
    12. Matthew Kotchen & Kathleen Segerson, 2020. "The Use of Group-Level Approaches to Environmental and Natural Resource Policy," NBER Working Papers 27142, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Jongwook Kim & Joseph T. Mahoney, 2002. "Resource-based and property rights perspectives on value creation: the case of oil field unitization," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(4-5), pages 225-245.
    14. Joel Kincaid, 2003. "The Determinants of Property Rights In U.S. Marine Fisheries," Law and Economics 0304004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Wielgus, Jeffrey & Poon, Sarah & del Río, Esperanza Carballal & Muñoz, Daylin & Whittle, Daniel & Fujita, Rod, 2014. "Fishery cooperatives in Cuba: Potential benefits, legal feasibility, and governance pre-conditions," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 128-137.
    16. Haque, A.B.M. Mahfuzul & Visser, Leontine E. & Dey, Madan M., 2011. "Institutional Arrangements in Seasonal Floodplain Management under Community-based Aquaculture in Bangladesh," Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Southeast Asian Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture (SEARCA), vol. 8(1), pages 1-19, June.
    17. Bergstén, Sabina & Stjernström, Olof & Pettersson, Örjan, 2018. "Experiences and emotions among private forest owners versus public interests: Why ownership matters," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 801-811.
    18. Deslatte, Aaron & Szmigiel-Rawska, Katarzyna & Tavares, António F. & Ślawska, Justyna & Karsznia, Izabela & Łukomska, Julita, 2022. "Land use institutions and social-ecological systems: A spatial analysis of local landscape changes in Poland," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
    19. Rögnvaldur Hannesson, 2011. "When is fish quota enforcement worth while? A study of the Northeast Arctic cod," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 139-160, July.
    20. David Aubin & Frédéric Varone, 2013. "Getting Access to Water: Property Rights or Public Policy Strategies?," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 31(1), pages 154-167, February.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:14:y:2022:i:22:p:15083-:d:972600. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: MDPI Indexing Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.mdpi.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.