Wildlife trade and endangered species protection
Markets for endangered species potentially generate incentives for both legal supply and poaching. To deter poaching, governments can spend on enforcement or increase legal harvesting to reduce the return from poaching. A leader–follower commitment game is developed to examine these choices in the presence of illegal harvesting and the resulting impacts on species stocks. In addition, current trade restrictions imposed under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora are examined. With Cournot conjectures among poachers, the model details the subgame perfect equilibrium interactions between poaching levels, enforcement and legal harvesting.
Volume (Year): 48 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: AARES Central Office Manager, Crawford School of Public Policy, ANU, Canberra ACT 0200|
Phone: 0409 032 338
Web page: http://www.aares.info
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Crabbe, Philippe & Van Long, Ngo, 1993.
"Entry deterrence and overexploitation of the fishery,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 679-704, July.
- Crabbe, P. & Long, N.V., 1988. "Entry Deterrence And Overexploitation Of The Fishery," Working Papers 8804, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
- Crabbe, P. & Van Long, N., 1991. "Entry Deterrence and Overexploitation of the Fishery," Working Papers 9101, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
- Alexander, Robert R., 2000. "Modelling species extinction: the case for non-consumptive values," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 259-269, November.
- Burton, Michael, 1999. "An assessment of alternative methods of estimating the effect of the ivory trade ban on poaching effort," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 93-106, July.
- Erwin H. Bulte & G. Cornelis van Kooten, 1999. "Economics of Antipoaching Enforcement and the Ivory Trade Ban," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 81(2), pages 453-466.
- Lee G. Anderson & Dwight R. Lee, 1986. "Optimal Governing Instrument, Operation Level, and Enforcement in Natural Resource Regulation: The Case of the Fishery," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 68(3), pages 678-690.
- Milliman, Scott R., 1986. "Optimal fishery management in the presence of illegal activity," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 363-381, December.
- Jon G. Sutinen & Peder Andersen, 1985. "The Economics of Fisheries Law Enforcement," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 64(4), pages 387-397. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:aareaj:117995. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.