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Fishery Management by Harvester Cooperatives

Author

Listed:
  • Robert T. Deacon

Abstract

Managing fisheries by delegating authority to an association of users, often organized as a cooperative, is gaining increased attention as a strategy for implementing rights-based reform. Assigning rights to groups rather than individuals can facilitate coordination and collective action and enable efficiency gains similar to those achieved when a firm organizes inputs centrally. Evidence from developed country fisheries managed by cooperatives indicates that coordination gains can be substantial. Furthermore, these gains often take forms overlooked in the traditional fishery reform literature, including those from enhanced product recovery and quality, improved spatial and temporal deployment of effort, and reduced environmental damage. In developing countries, assigning management responsibility to user groups can facilitate user-based provision of public goods in situations where governments do not function well. Developing country fishery cooperatives commonly provide monitoring and enforcement of access limitations, limits on fishing effort, and actions to conserve shared stocks. This article reviews empirical evidence on the performance of fishery cooperatives in developed and developing countries. A key conclusion is that using a combination of rights-based instruments can achieve efficiencies that cannot be captured by any single instrument. (JEL: Q20, Q22, D23). Copyright 2012, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert T. Deacon, 2012. "Fishery Management by Harvester Cooperatives," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 6(2), pages 258-277, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:renvpo:v:6:y:2012:i:2:p:258-277
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/reep/res008
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Benchekroun, Hassan & Gaudet, Gérard, 2015. "On the effects of mergers on equilibrium outcomes in a common property renewable asset oligopoly," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 209-223.
    2. Agbo, Maxime & Rousselière, Damien & Salanié, Julien, 2015. "Agricultural marketing cooperatives with direct selling: A cooperative–non-cooperative game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 56-71.
    3. Manning, Dale T. & Uchida, Hirotsugu, 2014. "Are Two Rents Better than None? When Monopoly Harvester Co-ops are Preferred to a Rent Dissipated Resource Sector," 2014 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2014, Minneapolis, Minnesota 171628, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    4. Maxime Agbo & Damien Rousselière & Julien Salanié, 2013. "A Theory of Agricultural Marketing Cooperatives with Direct selling," Working Papers halshs-00906894, HAL.
    5. repec:eee:jeborg:v:141:y:2017:i:c:p:254-276 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Wielgus, Jeffrey & Poon, Sarah & del Río, Esperanza Carballal & Muñoz, Daylin & Whittle, Daniel & Fujita, Rod, 2014. "Fishery cooperatives in Cuba: Potential benefits, legal feasibility, and governance pre-conditions," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 128-137.
    7. Zhou, Rong & Segerson, Kathleen, 2014. "Individual vs. Collective Quotas in Fisheries Management: Efficiency and Distributional Impacts," 2014 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2014, Minneapolis, Minnesota 170601, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    8. Jules Selles, 2018. "Fisheries management: what uncertainties matter?," Working Papers hal-01824238, HAL.
    9. repec:eee:wdevel:v:102:y:2018:i:c:p:57-70 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Ronald G. Felthoven & Jean Lee & Kurt E. Schnier, 2014. "Cooperative Formation and Peer Effects in Fisheries," Marine Resource Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(2), pages 133-156.
    11. Call, Isabel L. & Lew, Daniel K., 2015. "Tradable permit programs: What are the lessons for the new Alaska halibut catch sharing plan?," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 125-137.
    12. repec:hal:journl:halshs-01098762 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Itziar Lazkano & Linda Nøstbakken, 2016. "Quota Enforcement and Capital Investment in Natural Resource Industries," Marine Resource Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(3), pages 339-354.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights

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