The Determinants of Property Rights In U.S. Marine Fisheries
Using a sample of fisheries managed under the Magnuson Act, a probit model of the probability of property rights adoption is estimated. The probability of adoption increases as ex–vessel revenue increases and as proxies for transaction costs decrease.
|Date of creation:||22 Apr 2003|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||Type of Document - pdf ; prepared on IBM PC ; pages: 10; figures: Included. Draft Version, Do Not Cite WO permission|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://econwpa.repec.org|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Cheung, Steven N S, 1970. "The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-exclusive Resource," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(1), pages 49-70, April.
- Milliman, Scott R., 1986. "Optimal fishery management in the presence of illegal activity," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 363-381, December.
- Agnello, Richard J & Donnelley, Lawrence P, 1975. "Property Rights and Efficiency in the Oyster Industry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(2), pages 521-33, October.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwple:0304004. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.