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Property rights and contractual approach to sustainable development

Author

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  • Ben Yu
  • Daigee Shaw
  • Tsu-Tan Fu
  • Lawrence Lai

Abstract

Sustainable development is argued to exist in weak and strong versions. Although the use of a property rights and contractual approach has been well understood in the case of weak sustainable development, the approach has been virtually ignored in the strong version. This paper formulates a property rights and contractual approach for the strong version of sustainable development. By reference to an analytical model and examples from Hong Kong and Taiwan, a Schumpeterian process and the institution of resource entitlements are shown to be the necessary ingredients to promote the strong version of sustainable development. Copyright Springer Japan 2000

Suggested Citation

  • Ben Yu & Daigee Shaw & Tsu-Tan Fu & Lawrence Lai, 2000. "Property rights and contractual approach to sustainable development," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 3(3), pages 291-309, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:envpol:v:3:y:2000:i:3:p:291-309
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03354042
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Go, Virginia Khong & Lai, Lawrence Wai Chung, 2019. "Learning from Taiwan’s post-colonial heritage conservation," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 79-86.
    3. Chris Webster, 2005. "Editorial: Diversifying The Institutions Of Local Planning," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(4), pages 4-10, December.
    4. Hojman, David E. & Hiscock, Julia, 2010. "Interpreting suboptimal business outcomes in light of the Coase Theorem: Lessons from Sidmouth International Festival," Tourism Management, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 240-249.

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