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Use of Incentive-Based Management Systems to Limit Bycatch and Discarding

Author

Listed:
  • Pascoe, Sean
  • Innes, James
  • Holland, Dan
  • Fina, Mark
  • Thébaud, Olivier
  • Townsend, Ralph
  • Sanchirico, James
  • Arnason, Ragnar
  • Wilcox, Chris
  • Hutton, Trevor

Abstract

In most fisheries, a number of species are unintentionally caught as bycatch while attempting to catch the targeted species. While much of the bycatch problem is technological in nature due to imperfect selectivity of the fishing gear, fisher behaviour also plays a major role. How, when and where fishers choose to fish can influence catch composition and thereby the quantity of bycatch. Behavioural changes can be encouraged through the development of an appropriate set of incentives — both economic and social — to avoid bycatch and reduce discarding. In this paper, a number of alternative incentive-based bycatch management systems are reviewed. The potential applicability of these systems to quota species, non-commercial species and threatened or conservation-dependent species (such as turtles, seals, dolphins) is reviewed, and examples of their application are presented. The review concludes that incentive-based approaches can reduce the level of bycatch and discarding in most fisheries.

Suggested Citation

  • Pascoe, Sean & Innes, James & Holland, Dan & Fina, Mark & Thébaud, Olivier & Townsend, Ralph & Sanchirico, James & Arnason, Ragnar & Wilcox, Chris & Hutton, Trevor, 2010. "Use of Incentive-Based Management Systems to Limit Bycatch and Discarding," International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, now publishers, vol. 4(2), pages 123-161, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:now:jirere:101.00000032
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    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/101.00000032
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Rong Zhou & Kathleen Segerson, 2016. "Individual vs. Collective Approaches to Fisheries Management," Marine Resource Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(2), pages 165-192.
    2. Eliasen, Søren Qvist & Bichel, Nikolaj, 2016. "Fishers sharing real-time information about “bad” fishing locations. A tool for quota optimisation under a regime of landing obligations," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 16-23.
    3. Steve J. Miller & Robert T. Deacon, 2017. "Protecting Marine Ecosystems: Regulation Versus Market Incentives," Marine Resource Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(1), pages 83-107.
    4. Rajesh Singh & Quinn Weninger, 2015. "Cap-and-trade Bycatch Management with Costly Avoidance and Stock Uncertainty," Marine Resource Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 97-119.
    5. repec:eee:ecolec:v:146:y:2018:i:c:p:304-311 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Zhou, Rong & Segerson, Kathleen, 2014. "Individual vs. Collective Quotas in Fisheries Management: Efficiency and Distributional Impacts," 2014 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2014, Minneapolis, Minnesota 170601, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    7. Melstrom, Richard T., 2015. "Cyclical harvesting in fisheries with bycatch," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 1-15.
    8. Msomphora, Mbachi Ruth & Aanesen, Margrethe, 2015. "Is the catch quota management (CQM) mechanism attractive to fishers? A preliminary analysis of the Danish 2011 CQM trial project," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 78-87.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Incentive-based management; Bycatch; Discarding; Marine conservation; Fisheries management;

    JEL classification:

    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
    • Q27 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Issues in International Trade
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles

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