IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jbfina/v37y2013i9p3669-3680.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Investment horizon, risk, and compensation in the banking industry

Author

Listed:
  • Livne, Gilad
  • Markarian, Garen
  • Mironov, Maxim

Abstract

This paper examines the relation between the investment horizon of banks and their CEO compensation, and its consequences for risk and performance. We find that banks with short-term investment intensity pay more cash bonus, exhibit higher risk and perform more poorly than banks with longer-term investment intensity. This evidence is broadly consistent with the view that short-term means of compensation encouraged a short-term investment focus, which in turn led to both higher risk and resulted in poorer performance, culminating in the sub-prime crisis. The inverse risk-performance relation suggests pay schemes were incongruent with shareholders’ interest. Moreover, pay arrangements used in banks prior to the subprime crisis exposed banks to the ex-post settling up problem (the clawback problem).

Suggested Citation

  • Livne, Gilad & Markarian, Garen & Mironov, Maxim, 2013. "Investment horizon, risk, and compensation in the banking industry," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(9), pages 3669-3680.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:37:y:2013:i:9:p:3669-3680
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.05.021
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378426613002409
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.05.021?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Barro, Jason R & Barro, Robert J, 1990. "Pay, Performance, and Turnover of Bank CEOs," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 8(4), pages 448-481, October.
    2. Donald Morgan & Kevin Stiroh, 2001. "Market Discipline of Banks: The Asset Test," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 20(2), pages 195-208, October.
    3. Bebchuk, Lucian A. & Cohen, Alma, 2005. "The costs of entrenched boards," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 409-433, November.
    4. Flannery, Mark J. & Kwan, Simon H. & Nimalendran, M., 2004. "Market evidence on the opaqueness of banking firms' assets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 419-460, March.
    5. Rajiv D. Banker & Rong Huang & Ramachandran Natarajan, 2009. "Incentive Contracting and Value Relevance of Earnings and Cash Flows," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(3), pages 647-678, June.
    6. Zhenxu Tong, 2010. "CEO Risk Incentives and Corporate Cash Holdings," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(9‐10), pages 1248-1280, November.
    7. Stewart C. Myers & Raghuram G. Rajan, 1998. "The Paradox of Liquidity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(3), pages 733-771.
    8. Edward J. Riedl & George Serafeim, 2011. "Information Risk and Fair Values: An Examination of Equity Betas," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(4), pages 1083-1122, September.
    9. David A. Becher & Terry L. Campbell II & Melissa B. Frye, 2005. "Incentive Compensation for Bank Directors: The Impact of Deregulation," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(5), pages 1753-1778, September.
    10. Elijah Brewer & William C. Hunter & William E. Jackson, 2004. "Investment opportunity set, product mix, and the relationship between bank CEO compensation and risk-taking," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2004-36, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    11. Leone, Andrew J. & Wu, Joanna Shuang & Zimmerman, Jerold L., 2006. "Asymmetric sensitivity of CEO cash compensation to stock returns," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 167-192, October.
    12. Patrick Bolton & José Scheinkman & Wei Xiong, 2006. "Executive Compensation and Short-Termist Behaviour in Speculative Markets," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 73(3), pages 577-610.
    13. John, Kose & Saunders, Anthony & Senbet, Lemma W, 2000. "A Theory of Bank Regulation and Management Compensation," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 13(1), pages 95-125.
    14. Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song Shin, 2009. "Money, Liquidity, and Monetary Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(2), pages 600-605, May.
    15. Patrick Bolton & Jose Scheinkman & Wei Xiong, 2005. "Pay for Short-Term Performance: Executive Compensation in Speculative," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000673, UCLA Department of Economics.
    16. Dechow, Patricia M. & Myers, Linda A. & Shakespeare, Catherine, 2010. "Fair value accounting and gains from asset securitizations: A convenient earnings management tool with compensation side-benefits," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1-2), pages 2-25, February.
    17. Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Andrew A. Samwick, 1999. "The Other Side of the Trade-off: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(1), pages 65-105, February.
    18. Martin J. Conyon & John E. Core & Wayne R. Guay, 2011. "Are U.S. CEOs Paid More Than U.K. CEOs? Inferences from Risk-adjusted Pay," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(2), pages 402-438.
    19. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    20. DeYoung, Robert & Peng, Emma Y. & Yan, Meng, 2013. "Executive Compensation and Business Policy Choices at U.S. Commercial Banks," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(1), pages 165-196, February.
    21. Core, John E. & Holthausen, Robert W. & Larcker, David F., 1999. "Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 371-406, March.
    22. Rajgopal, Shivaram & Shevlin, Terry, 2002. "Empirical evidence on the relation between stock option compensation and risk taking," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 145-171, June.
    23. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-264, April.
    24. John Core & Wayne Guay, 2002. "Estimating the Value of Employee Stock Option Portfolios and Their Sensitivities to Price and Volatility," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(3), pages 613-630, June.
    25. Houston, Joel F. & James, Christopher, 1995. "CEO compensation and bank risk Is compensation in banking structured to promote risk taking?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 405-431, November.
    26. Garvey, Gerald T. & Milbourn, Todd T., 2006. "Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation: Executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 197-225, October.
    27. Coles, Jeffrey L. & Daniel, Naveen D. & Naveen, Lalitha, 2006. "Managerial incentives and risk-taking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 431-468, February.
    28. Hyun-Han Shin & Rene M. Stulz, 2000. "Firm Value, Risk, and Growth Opportunities," NBER Working Papers 7808, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    29. Canice Prendergast, 2002. "The Tenuous Trade-off between Risk and Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(5), pages 1071-1102, October.
    30. John D. Knopf & Jouahn Nam & John H. Thornton, 2002. "The Volatility and Price Sensitivities of Managerial Stock Option Portfolios and Corporate Hedging," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(2), pages 801-813, April.
    31. Donald P. Morgan, 2002. "Rating Banks: Risk and Uncertainty in an Opaque Industry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 874-888, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kolasinski, Adam C. & Yang, Nan, 2018. "Managerial myopia and the mortgage meltdown," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(3), pages 466-485.
    2. Delis, Manthos D. & Karavias, Yiannis, 2015. "Optimal versus realized bank credit risk and monetary policy," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 16(C), pages 13-30.
    3. Shasha Liu & Robin Sickles, 2021. "The agency problem revisited: a structural analysis of managerial productivity and CEO compensation in large US commercial banks," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 60(1), pages 391-418, January.
    4. Amewu, Godfred & Alagidede, Paul, 2019. "Mergers and executive compensation changes: Evidence from African markets," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 397-419.
    5. Pathan, Shams & Haq, Mamiza & Faff, Robert & Seymour, Trent, 2021. "Institutional investor horizon and bank risk-taking," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    6. Matousek, Roman & Tzeremes, Nickolaos G., 2016. "CEO compensation and bank efficiency: An application of conditional nonparametric frontiers," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 251(1), pages 264-273.
    7. Michael Hilmer, 2014. "Bailouts, Bonuses and Bankers' Short-Termism," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2014-17, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    8. Uri Ben Zion & Garen Markarian, 2018. "Board Size, Crisis, and Firm Performance: Evidence from Banks," International Journal of Economics and Finance, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 10(4), pages 33-50, April.
    9. Sanders Shaffer, 2012. "Evaluating the impact of fair value accounting on financial institutions: implications for accounting standards setting and bank supervision," Supervisory Research and Analysis Working Papers QAU12-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    10. Rebel A. Cole & Travis Davidson & Hongxia Wang, 2021. "Why do bank holding companies purchase bank-owned life insurance?," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 57(1), pages 29-59, July.
    11. Dong, Yizhe & Girardone, Claudia & Kuo, Jing-Ming, 2017. "Governance, efficiency and risk taking in Chinese banking," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 211-229.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Livne, Gilad & Markarian, Garen & Milne, Alistair, 2011. "Bankers' compensation and fair value accounting," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 1096-1115, September.
    2. Bai, Gang & Elyasiani, Elyas, 2013. "Bank stability and managerial compensation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 799-813.
    3. repec:cte:wbrepe:wb1501 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Mohamed Belkhir & Abdelaziz Chazi, 2010. "Compensation Vega, Deregulation, and Risk‐Taking: Lessons from the US Banking Industry," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(9‐10), pages 1218-1247, November.
    5. Duru, Augustine & Iyengar, Raghavan J. & Zampelli, Ernest M., 2012. "Performance choice, executive bonuses and corporate leverage," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(5), pages 1286-1305.
    6. Croci, Ettore & Petmezas, Dimitris, 2015. "Do risk-taking incentives induce CEOs to invest? Evidence from acquisitions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 1-23.
    7. Julia Grant & Garen Markarian & Antonio Parbonetti, 2009. "CEO Risk†Related Incentives and Income Smoothing," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 26(4), pages 1029-1065, December.
    8. Ahmed, Shaker & Ranta, Mikko & Vähämaa, Emilia & Vähämaa, Sami, 2023. "Facial attractiveness and CEO compensation: Evidence from the banking industry," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).
    9. Jones, Jeffrey S. & Lee, Wayne Y. & Yeager, Timothy J., 2013. "Valuation and systemic risk consequences of bank opacity," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 693-706.
    10. DeYoung, Robert & Huang, Minjie, 2021. "The external effects of bank executive pay: Liquidity creation and systemic risk," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 47(C).
    11. Hagendorff, Jens & Vallascas, Francesco, 2011. "CEO pay incentives and risk-taking: Evidence from bank acquisitions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 1078-1095, September.
    12. Yaowen Shan & Terry Walter, 2016. "Towards a Set of Design Principles for Executive Compensation Contracts," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 52(4), pages 619-684, December.
    13. Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, 2010. "CEO Compensation," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 75-102, December.
    14. Richard Heaney & Vineet Tawani & John Goodwin, 2010. "Australian CEO Remuneration," Economic Papers, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 29(2), pages 109-127, June.
    15. Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger & Stulz, René M., 2011. "Bank CEO incentives and the credit crisis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(1), pages 11-26, January.
    16. Gao, Huasheng, 2010. "Optimal compensation contracts when managers can hedge," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 218-238, August.
    17. Gormley, Todd A. & Matsa, David A. & Milbourn, Todd, 2013. "CEO compensation and corporate risk: Evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 79-101.
    18. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2016. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1232-1287, December.
    19. Mónica López-Puertas Lamy, 2012. "How does Ownership Structure Influence Bank Risk? Analyzing the Role of Managerial Incentives," Working Papers 1208, Departament Empresa, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, revised Nov 2012.
    20. Albuquerque, Ana, 2009. "Peer firms in relative performance evaluation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 69-89, October.
    21. Gande, Amar & Kalpathy, Swaminathan, 2017. "CEO compensation and risk-taking at financial firms: Evidence from U.S. federal loan assistance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 131-150.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Investment horizon; Compensation; Risk; Performance; Clawback problem;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:37:y:2013:i:9:p:3669-3680. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jbf .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.