Information technology, organizational design, and transfer pricing
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- Christie, Andrew A. & Joye, Marc P. & Watts, Ross L., 2003.
"Decentralization of the firm: theory and evidence,"
Journal of Corporate Finance,
Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 3-36, January.
- Christie, A.W. & Joye, M.P. & Watts, R.L., 1991. "Decentralization of the Firm: Theory and Evidence," Papers 91-03, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, July.
- Jack Hirshleifer, 1956. "On the Economics of Transfer Pricing," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29, pages 172-172.
- J. A. Mirrlees, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(2), pages 175-208.
- Anil Arya & John Fellingham & Jonathan Glover & K. Sivaramakrishnan, 2000. "Capital Budgeting, the Hold-up Problem, and Information System Design," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 46(2), pages 205-216, February.
- L. W. Copithorne, 1971. "International Corporate Transfer Prices and Government Policy," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 4(3), pages 324-341, August.
- Demski, Joel S. & Sappington, David, 1984. "Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 152-171, June.
- Nahum Melumad & Dilip Mookherjee & Stefan Reichelstein, 1997. "Contract Complexity, Incentives, and the Value of Delegation," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(1), pages 257-289, 06.
- Melamad, N. & Mookherjee, D. & Reichelstein, S., 1996. "Contract Complexity, Incentives and the Value of Delegation," Papers 70, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Nahum Melamad & Dilip Mookherjee & Stefan Reichelstein, 1996. "Contract Complexity, Incentives and the Value of Delegation," Papers 0070, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Guesnerie, Roger & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1984. "A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 329-369, December.
- Vaysman, Igor, 1998. "A model of negotiated transfer pricing," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 349-384, June.
- Samuelson, Larry, 1982. "The multinational firm with arm's length transfer price limits," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3-4), pages 365-374, November.
- Sappington, David E. M., 1986. "Commitment to regulatory bureaucracy," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 243-258, December.
- Demsetz, Harold, 1988. "The Theory of the Firm Revisited," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 141-161, Spring.
- Melumad, Nahum & Mookherjee, Dilip & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1992. "A theory of responsibility centers," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 445-484, December.
- Horst, Thomas, 1971. "The Theory of the Multinational Firm: Optimal Behavior under Different Tariff and Tax Rates," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(5), pages 1059-1072, Sept.-Oct. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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