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A model of participatory persuasion

Author

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  • Deng, Liuchun
  • Sun, Yufeng

Abstract

This paper introduces the concept of participatory persuasion in autocracies, where regimes use controlled communication to sustain their rule. In an overlapping-generations model of democratization, we show that the regime’s survival can be prolonged when citizens communicate within small circles compared to a setting in which communication is entirely absent. Paradoxically, limited freedom of speech enhances the regime’s persuasion by turning citizens into inadvertent agents of state propaganda. We further extend the analysis to settings with homophily or under state censorship.

Suggested Citation

  • Deng, Liuchun & Sun, Yufeng, 2026. "A model of participatory persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 657-683.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:158:y:2026:i:c:p:657-683
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.05.006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights

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