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How do anticorruption measures affect executive incentive?

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  • Tian, Ni
  • Zhang, Zongyi

Abstract

This paper investigates how anticorruption measures affect corporate governance, especially the executive incentive mechanism. The results of empirical tests show that in the short term, alleviating corruption does not enhance executives incentive, however, it significantly escalates pay-performance sensitivity. It is also found reductions in executive incentive in state-owned companies are more salient than in non-state-owned companies. The suggestion is that anticorruption measures at firm level should be a long-term strategy and focus on state-owned companies. It provides a new perspective for understanding how anticorruption affects firm behavior and performance and for the literature on executive incentives with political intervention.

Suggested Citation

  • Tian, Ni & Zhang, Zongyi, 2018. "How do anticorruption measures affect executive incentive?," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 179-185.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finlet:v:24:y:2018:i:c:p:179-185
    DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2017.09.004
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    Cited by:

    1. Fu, Yishu, 2019. "The value of corporate governance: Evidence from the Chinese anti-corruption campaign," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 461-476.
    2. Zhao, Renjie & Chen, Jie & Feng, Chen & Zhong, Shihu, 2020. "The impact of anti-corruption measures on land supply and the associated implications: The case of China," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
    3. Kong, Dongmin & Zhu, Ling & Wang, Xin, 2022. "Anti-corruption and CEO compensation: Evidence from a natural experiment in China," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
    4. Huang, Ying Sophie & Li, Mengyu, 2019. "Are overconfident executives alike? overconfident executives and compensation structure: Evidence from China," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 434-449.
    5. Cheng, Maoyong & Geng, Hongyan, 2021. "Do local firms employ political activities to respond to political uncertainty?," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    6. Shenghui Tong, 2022. "Corruption and anti‐corruption in China: a review and future research agenda," Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, The Crawford School, The Australian National University, vol. 36(1), pages 3-16, May.
    7. Zhen Qi & Tristan Kenderdine & Tingfeng Tang & Qiren Liu, 2022. "China's anti‐corruption campaign and outward foreign direct investment by state‐owned enterprises," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(9), pages 2950-2976, September.
    8. Yao, Wenyun & Wei, Jiahui & Shen, Yongjian & Deng, Yan & Kutan, Ali M., 2020. "Does celebrity spokesperson signal firm performance? Evidence from a drug scandal in China," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 34(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Anticorruption; Executive incentives; Quasi experiment; Difference-in-differences Method;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation

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