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Does bribery help or hurt firm growth around the world?

Author

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  • Jessie Zhou

    ()

  • Mike Peng

    ()

Abstract

Does bribery help or hurt firm growth? Some suggest that bribery greases the wheel of commerce, while others believe that bribery sands the wheel of growth. We argue that firms endogenously choose their level of bribery according to their environments and that the benefits and costs may differ for different types of bribery. Specifically, small firms are more likely to be forced to engage in bribery, while big firms may strategically engage in bribery. Utilizing a large, cross-country survey sample involving 2,686 firms in 48 countries, we find that firms choose a higher level of bribery when embedded in under-developed market-supporting institutions. After controlling for endogenous bribery choices, bribery hurts firm growth for small and medium-sized firms, but not for large firms. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Suggested Citation

  • Jessie Zhou & Mike Peng, 2012. "Does bribery help or hurt firm growth around the world?," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 907-921, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:asiapa:v:29:y:2012:i:4:p:907-921
    DOI: 10.1007/s10490-011-9274-4
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10490-011-9274-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Micheline Goedhuys & Pierre Mohnen & Tamer Taha, 2016. "Corruption, innovation and firm growth: firm-level evidence from Egypt and Tunisia," Eurasian Business Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 6(3), pages 299-322, December.
    2. Yan Li & Fiona Yao & David Ahlstrom, 2015. "The social dilemma of bribery in emerging economies: A dynamic model of emotion, social value, and institutional uncertainty," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 311-334, June.
    3. Sheila Puffer & Daniel McCarthy & Alfred Jaeger & Denise Dunlap, 2013. "The use of favors by emerging market managers: Facilitator or inhibitor of international expansion?," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 327-349, June.
    4. Addis G. Birhanu & Alfonso Gambardella & Giovanni Valentini, 2016. "Bribery and investment: Firm-level evidence from Africa and Latin America," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(9), pages 1865-1877, September.
    5. Lau, Chi Keung Marco & Demir, Ender & Bilgin, Mehmet Huseyin, 2013. "Experience-based corporate corruption and stock market volatility: Evidence from emerging markets," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 17(C), pages 1-13.
    6. repec:eee:iburev:v:27:y:2018:i:1:p:34-45 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. repec:eee:finlet:v:24:y:2018:i:c:p:179-185 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. repec:ekd:006356:6689 is not listed on IDEAS

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