Misselling (financial) products: The limits for internal compliance
A firm advises customers through an agent, such as a mortgage broker, who is incentivized through commissions and the threat of firing. We show that this implies an upper boundary for the feasible "standard of advice", up to which the standard increases with commissions.
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