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Do financial advisor commissions distort client choice?


  • Beyer, Max
  • de Meza, David
  • Reyniers, Diane


This experiment shows that varying the commission received by financial advisors strongly influences insurance purchase.

Suggested Citation

  • Beyer, Max & de Meza, David & Reyniers, Diane, 2013. "Do financial advisor commissions distort client choice?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(2), pages 117-119.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:119:y:2013:i:2:p:117-119 DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.01.026

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Daylian M. Cain & George Loewenstein & Don A. Moore, 2005. "The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 1-25, January.
    2. Roman Inderst & Marco Ottaviani, 2009. "Misselling through Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 883-908, June.
    3. Daniel Bergstresser & John M. R. Chalmers & Peter Tufano, 2009. "Assessing the Costs and Benefits of Brokers in the Mutual Fund Industry," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(10), pages 4129-4156, October.
    4. Inderst, Roman, 2010. "Misselling (financial) products: The limits for internal compliance," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 35-37, January.
    5. Utpal Bhattacharya & Andreas Hackethal & Simon Kaesler & Benjamin Loos & Steffen Meyer, 2012. "Is Unbiased Financial Advice to Retail Investors Sufficient? Answers from a Large Field Study," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 25(4), pages 975-1032.
    6. Susan E. K. Christoffersen & Richard Evans & David K. Musto, 2013. "What Do Consumers’ Fund Flows Maximize? Evidence from Their Brokers’ Incentives," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 68(1), pages 201-235, February.
    7. John Chalmers & Jonathan Reuter, 2012. "Is Conflicted Investment Advice Better than No Advice?," NBER Working Papers 18158, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Sendhil Mullainathan & Markus Noeth & Antoinette Schoar, 2012. "The Market for Financial Advice: An Audit Study," NBER Working Papers 17929, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Daylian M. Cain & George Loewenstein & Don A. Moore, 2011. "When Sunlight Fails to Disinfect: Understanding the Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest," Journal of Consumer Research, Oxford University Press, vol. 37(5), pages 836-857.
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    Cited by:

    1. Shinozawa, Yoshikatsu & Vivian, Andrew, 2015. "Determinants of money flows into investment trusts in Japan," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 138-161.
    2. Johannes G. Jaspersen, 2016. "Hypothetical Surveys And Experimental Studies Of Insurance Demand: A Review," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 83(1), pages 217-255, January.
    3. repec:eee:jcecon:v:45:y:2017:i:3:p:429-444 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Paul Chen & Martin Richardson, 2016. "Conflict of Interest, Disclosure, and Vertical Relationships: An Experimental Analysis," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2016-647, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
    5. repec:eee:ecolet:v:162:y:2018:i:c:p:167-170 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Sane, Renuka & Halan, Monika, 2017. "Misled and mis-sold: financial misbehaviour in retail banks?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 429-444.
    7. Jeremy Burke & Angela Hung & Jack Clift & Steven Garber & Joanne K. Yoong, 2015. "Impacts of Conflicts of Interest in the Financial Services Industry," Working Papers WR-1076, RAND Corporation.

    More about this item


    Commission selling; Financial advisor; Consumer bias;

    JEL classification:

    • G02 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Behavioral Finance: Underlying Principles
    • G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage


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