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Schuldenanstieg und Haftungsausschluss im deutschen Föderalstaat: Zur Rolle des Moral Hazard

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  • Wolff, Guntram B.

Abstract

Einleitung: Die deutschen Staatsschulden sind in den letzten Jahrzehnten kontinuierlich gestiegen. Künftige Generationen werden zusätzlich aufgrund der demographischen Entwicklung durch die umlagenfinanzierten sozialen Sicherungssysteme belastet. Gerade auch der Anstieg der Verschuldung der Bundesländer war in den letzten Jahrzehnten spürbar. So betrug die Verschuldung aller deutschen Bundesländer zusammengenommen 1991 noch 168 Mrd. Euro, während Anfang 2007 die Verschuldung 483 Mrd. Euro betrug, was eine knappe Verdopplung der Schuldenquote der Länder (Verschuldung in Prozent des BIP) auf ca. 21 Prozent impliziert. In der aktuellen Diskussion um die Reform des deutschen Föderalismus besteht Einigkeit in der Diagnose des Problems. Die Entwicklung der Staatsschulden ist kritisch und darf sich so nicht fortsetzen. Uneinigkeit herrscht hingegen über die Ursache des Anstiegs. Ebenfalls wird um die beste Möglichkeit, diesen zu bremsen, gerungen. Verschiedene Autoren argumentieren, dass der Verschuldungsanstieg der deutschen Bundesländer vor allem auf den Moral Hazard Anreiz zurückzuführen ist. Der vorliegende Diskussionsbeitrag diskutiert dies als einen der möglichen Gründe des Schuldenanstiegs. Hierzu wird zunächst das Konzept kurz eingeführt. Anschließend wird die bestehende empirische Evidenz für Deutschland diskutiert. Schließlich wird eine Bewertung und Einordnung in die aktuelle Debatte vorgenommen.

Suggested Citation

  • Wolff, Guntram B., 2007. "Schuldenanstieg und Haftungsausschluss im deutschen Föderalstaat: Zur Rolle des Moral Hazard," IMFS Working Paper Series 14, Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:imfswp:14
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Wyplosz, Charles, 2005. "Fiscal Policy: Institutions versus Rules," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 191, pages 64-78, January.
    2. Kirsten H. Heppke‐Falk & Guntram B. Wolff, 2008. "Moral Hazard and Bail‐Out in Fiscal Federations: Evidence for the German Länder," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(3), pages 425-446, August.
    3. Charles Wyplosz, 2005. "Fiscal Policy: Institutions versus Rules," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 191(1), pages 64-78, January.
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    5. Roman Inderst & Holger M. Mueller, 2010. "CEO Replacement Under Private Information," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(8), pages 2935-2969, August.
    6. Inderst, Roman & Mueller, Holger M., 2009. "Early-stage financing and firm growth in new industries," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 276-291, August.
    7. Inderst, Roman & Mueller, Holger M., 2008. "Bank capital structure and credit decisions," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 295-314, July.
    8. Inderst, Roman, 2009. "Loan origination under soft- and hard-information lending," IMFS Working Paper Series 27, Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • H74 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Borrowing
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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