Compensation for environmental services and intergovernmental fiscal transfers: The case of India
This paper studies mechanisms to compensate local government for the public provision of environmental services using the theory of optimal fiscal transfers in India. Especially, we analyzed the role of intergovernmental fiscal transfers in achieving the environmental goal. Simply assigning the functions at appropriate levels does not ensure optimal provision of environmental services. Optimality in resource allocation could be achieved by combining the assignment system with an appropriate compensation mechanism. Intergovernmental fiscal transfers would be a suitable mechanism for compensating the local governments and help in internalizing the spillover effects of providing environmental public goods. Illustrations are also provided for India.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- repec:npf:wpaper:25 is not listed on IDEAS
- Hilary Sigman, 2004.
"Transboundary Spillovers and Decentralization of Environmental Policies,"
Departmental Working Papers
200416, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Sigman, Hilary, 2005. "Transboundary spillovers and decentralization of environmental policies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 82-101, July.
- Hilary Sigman, 2004. "Transboundary Spillovers and Decentralization of Environmental Policies," NBER Working Papers 10717, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dur, Robert & Staal, Klaas, 2006.
"Local Public Good Provision, Municipal Consolidation, and National Transfers,"
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
86, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Dur, Robert & Staal, Klaas, 2008. "Local public good provision, municipal consolidation, and national transfers," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 160-173, March.
- Robert Dur & Klaas Staal, 2007. "Local Public Good Provision, Municipal Consolidation, and National Transfers," CESifo Working Paper Series 2061, CESifo Group Munich.
- Shah, Anwar, 2006.
"A practitioner's guide to intergovernmental fiscal transfers,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
4039, The World Bank.
- Anwar Shah, 2006. "A Practitioner´s Guide to Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers," Revista de Economía y Estadística, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Instituto de Economía y Finanzas, vol. 0(2), pages 128-186, July.
- A. B. Atkinson & N. H. Stern, 1974. "Pigou, Taxation and Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(1), pages 119-128.
- Quentin Grafton, R. & Jotzo, Frank & Wasson, Merrilyn, 2004.
"Financing sustainable development: Country Undertakings and Rights for Environmental Sustainability CURES,"
Elsevier, vol. 51(1-2), pages 65-78, November.
- R. Quentin Grafton & Frank Jotzo & Merrilyn Wasson, 2004. "Financing Sustainable Development : Country Undertakings and Rights for Environmental Sustainability (CURES)," Economics and Environment Network Working Papers 0403, Australian National University, Economics and Environment Network.
- Gray, Wayne B. & Shadbegian, R.J.Ronald J., 2004.
"'Optimal' pollution abatement--whose benefits matter, and how much?,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 510-534, May.
- Wayne B. Gray & Ronald J. Shadbegian, 2002. "‘Optimal’ Pollution Abatement – Whose Benefits Matter, and How Much?," NCEE Working Paper Series 200205, National Center for Environmental Economics, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, revised Sep 2002.
- Wayne B. Gray & Ronald J. Shadbegian, 2002. "Optimal Pollution Abatement - Whose Benefits Matter, and How Much?," NBER Working Papers 9125, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Oates, Wallace, 2001. "A Reconsideration of Environmental Federalism," Discussion Papers dp-01-54, Resources For the Future.
- Bird, Richard M. & Smart, Michael, 2002. "Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers: International Lessons for Developing Countries," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 899-912, June.
- Bev Dahlby, 1996. "Fiscal externalities and the design of intergovernmental grants," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 3(3), pages 397-412, July.
- Mandal, Subrata & M. Govinda Rao, 2005. "Overlapping fiscal domains and effectiveness of environmental policy in India," Working Papers 05/25, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.
- Breton,Albert, 1996. "Competitive Governments," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521481021, December.
- Hajkowicz, Stefan, 2007. "Allocating scarce financial resources across regions for environmental management in Queensland, Australia," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2-3), pages 208-216, March.
- Erwin Bulte & John List & Jason Shogren, 2002.
""Beggar thy Neighbor:" Testing for Free Riding in State-Level Endangered Species Expenditures,"
Natural Field Experiments
00513, The Field Experiments Website.
- List, John A & Bulte, Erwin H & Shogren, Jason F, 2002. ""Beggar Thy Neighbor": Testing for Free Riding in State-Level Endangered Species Expenditures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 111(3-4), pages 303-15, June.
- Barton, D.N. & Rusch, G. & May, P. & Ring, I. & Unnerstall, H. & Santos, R. & Antunes, P. & Brouwer, R. & Grieg-Gran, M. & Similä, J. & Primmer, E. & Romeiro, A. & DeClerck, F. & Ibrahim, M., 2009. "Assessing the role of economic instruments in a policy mix for biodiversity conservation and ecosystem services provision: a review of some methodological challenges," MPRA Paper 15554, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Engel, Stefanie & Pagiola, Stefano & Wunder, Sven, 2008. "Designing payments for environmental services in theory and practice: An overview of the issues," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(4), pages 663-674, May.
- Ring, Irene, 2002. "Ecological public functions and fiscal equalisation at the local level in Germany," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 415-427, September.
- Helland, Eric & Whitford, Andrew B., 2003. "Pollution incidence and political jurisdiction: evidence from the TRI," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 403-424, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:68:y:2009:i:12:p:3052-3059. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shamier, Wendy)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.