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Overlapping fiscal domains and effectiveness of environmental policy in India

Author

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  • Mandal, Subrata

    (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)

  • M. Govinda Rao

    (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)

Abstract

The paper analyses the assignment systems and implementation aspects of environmental regulation in regard to water, air, and forests. The assignment of environmental functions and its overlapping is analysed in terms of not only the different levels of government, but also between the executive and judiciary. Specifically, the paper examines judicial intervention in environmental protection in India and argues that judicial activism although can be construed as a part of "checks and balances" in a federal system, it cannot be a substitute to the failure of executive in undertaking the task of environmental protection. The paper also analyses the implementation aspects of environmental policy, particularly the effectiveness of policies and institutions relating to environmental governance. Despite a reasonably clear assignment system, the implementation of environmental functions has not been satisfactory. In most cases, an important factor impeding effective implementation is seen in the structure of incentives to bureaucracy and policy makers and influence of polluters on them. Besides, the environmental regulators do not have access to modern technology and inadequate resources to measure and regulate pollution levels. The paper highlights overlapping roles of executive and judiciary in implementing environmental regulation. In other words, failure of the executive to regulate and monitor pollution levels as well as forest cover has led to the Supreme Court intervention. Interpreting that access to clean water and air as a fundamental right, the courts have pronounced several judgements on the implementation of environmental regulation virtually taking over the role of executive. This has helped to resolve the issues in the short term and in some cases has led to the improvement in environmental quality. However, the solution is ad hoc as the courts cannot undertake the task of implementation nor do they have the technical knowledge to deal with complex problems of environmental regulation. Besides, technology is not static and mandating a technical solution through a judgement such as the use of a particular technology or particular fuel for running of commercial vehicles can create serious problems in the long term. The solution lies in reforming the incentive structure and institutions of governance to make the executive much more sensitive and accountable to environmental issues.

Suggested Citation

  • Mandal, Subrata & M. Govinda Rao, 2005. "Overlapping fiscal domains and effectiveness of environmental policy in India," Working Papers 05/25, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.
  • Handle: RePEc:npf:wpaper:05/25
    Note: Working Paper 25, 2005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    2. Gianluigi Galeotti & Albert Breton, 1986. "An Economic Theory of Political Parties," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(1), pages 47-65, February.
    3. Singh, Nirvikar & Rao, Govinda, 2006. "Political Economy of Federalism in India," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195686937.
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    Cited by:

    1. Chakraborty, Lekha S, 2006. "Determining Environmental Quality in a Federal Setting: An Empirical Analysis of Subnational Governments in India," MPRA Paper 7605, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Divya Datt & Meeta Keswani Mehra, 2016. "Environmental Policy in a Federation with Special Interest Politics and Inter-Governmental Grants," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 64(4), pages 575-595, August.
    3. Kumar, Surender & Managi, Shunsuke, 2009. "Compensation for environmental services and intergovernmental fiscal transfers: The case of India," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(12), pages 3052-3059, October.

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