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Gone with the Wind: Federalism and the Strategic Location of Air Polluters

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  • James E. Monogan
  • David M. Konisky
  • Neal D. Woods

Abstract

In federal systems, both state governments and firms have incentives to strategically locate polluting facilities where the environmental and health consequences will be borne as much as possible by residents of other jurisdictions. We analyze air polluter location in the United States using a spatial point pattern model, which models where events occur in latitude and longitude. Our analyses indicate that major air polluters are significantly more likely to be located near a state's downwind border than a control group of other industrial facilities, results that are robust to a wide variety of model specifications and measurement strategies. This effect is particularly pronounced for facilities with toxic air emissions. The observed pattern of polluter location varies systematically across states and time in ways that suggest it is responsive to public policy at both the national and state levels.

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  • James E. Monogan & David M. Konisky & Neal D. Woods, 2017. "Gone with the Wind: Federalism and the Strategic Location of Air Polluters," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 61(2), pages 257-270, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:61:y:2017:i:2:p:257-270
    DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12278
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    3. Boucekkine, Raouf & Fabbri, Giorgio & Federico, Salvatore & Gozzi, Fausto, 2022. "A dynamic theory of spatial externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 133-165.
    4. Torre, Davide La & Liuzzi, Danilo & Marsiglio, Simone, 2021. "Transboundary pollution externalities: Think globally, act locally?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
    5. Mark Borgschulte & David Molitor & Eric Zou, 2022. "Air Pollution and the Labor Market: Evidence from Wildfire Smoke," NBER Working Papers 29952, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Haiqing Hu & Di Chen & Chun‐Ping Chang & Yin Chu, 2021. "The Political Economy Of Environmental Consequences: A Review Of The Empirical Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(1), pages 250-306, February.
    7. Chen, Shuo & Li, Yiran & Shi, Guang & Zhu, Zhitao, 2021. "Gone with the wind? Emissions of neighboring coal-fired power plants and local public health in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    8. Bo Sui & Chun-Ping Chang & Yin Chu, 2021. "Political Stability: an Impetus for Spatial Environmental Spillovers," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 79(2), pages 387-415, June.
    9. Li, Xuehui & Xu, Yangyang & Yao, Xin, 2021. "Effects of industrial agglomeration on haze pollution: A Chinese city-level study," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 148(PA).
    10. David R. Agrawal & William H. Hoyt & John D. Wilson, 2022. "Local Policy Choice: Theory and Empirics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 60(4), pages 1378-1455, December.
    11. Yang, Muzhe & Chou, Shin-Yi, 2018. "The impact of environmental regulation on fetal health: Evidence from the shutdown of a coal-fired power plant located upwind of New Jersey," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 269-293.
    12. Raouf Boucekkine & Giorgio Fabbri & Salvatore Federico & Fausto Gozzi, 2020. "A dynamic theory of spatial externalities," Working Papers halshs-02613177, HAL.

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