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Marginal contribution, reciprocity and equity in segregated groups: Bounded rationality and self-organization in social networks

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  • Kirman, Alan
  • Markose, Sheri
  • Giansante, Simone
  • Pin, Paolo

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  • Kirman, Alan & Markose, Sheri & Giansante, Simone & Pin, Paolo, 2007. "Marginal contribution, reciprocity and equity in segregated groups: Bounded rationality and self-organization in social networks," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 2085-2107, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:31:y:2007:i:6:p:2085-2107
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 159-181, Summer.
    2. Robert Axtell, 2005. "The Complexity of Exchange," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(504), pages 193-210, June.
    3. Elinor Ostrom, 2000. "Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 137-158, Summer.
    4. Jackson, Matthew O. & Watts, Alison, 2002. "The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 265-295, October.
    5. Roth, Alvin E. & Vesna Prasnikar & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara & Shmuel Zamir, 1991. "Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1068-1095, December.
    6. Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "Social Norms, Local Interaction, And Neighborhood Planning ," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(1), pages 265-296, February.
    7. Alan P. Kirman, 1992. "Whom or What Does the Representative Individual Represent?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 117-136, Spring.
    8. Sheri M. Markose, 2005. "Computability and Evolutionary Complexity: Markets as Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS)," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(504), pages 159-192, June.
    9. Jackson, Matthew O., 2005. "Allocation rules for network games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 128-154, April.
    10. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December.
    11. Jackson, Matthew O. & Wolinsky, Asher, 1996. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 44-74, October.
    12. Weisbuch, Gerard & Kirman, Alan & Herreiner, Dorothea, 2000. "Market Organisation and Trading Relationships," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(463), pages 411-436, April.
    13. George A. Akerlof, 1997. "Social Distance and Social Decisions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1005-1028, September.
    14. Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, 2000. "Optimal Parochialism: The Dynamics of Trust and Exclusion in Networks," Working Papers 00-03-017, Santa Fe Institute.
    15. Kranton, Rachel E, 1996. "Reciprocal Exchange: A Self-Sustaining System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 830-851, September.
    16. Winter, Eyal, 2002. "The shapley value," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 53, pages 2025-2054 Elsevier.
    17. Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, 2000. "Optimal Parochialism: The Dynamics of Trust and Exclusion in Networks," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2000-06, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. David Anzola & Peter Barbrook-Johnson & Juan I. Cano, 0. "Self-organization and social science," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 0, pages 1-37.
    2. Sengupta, Abhijit & Greetham, Danica Vukadinovic, 2010. "Dynamics of brand competition: Effects of unobserved social networks," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(12), pages 2391-2406, December.
    3. Craig, Ben & von Peter, Goetz, 2014. "Interbank tiering and money center banks," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 322-347.
    4. Sheri Markose & Simone Giansante & Mateusz Gatkowski & Ali Rais Shaghaghi, 2010. "Too Interconnected To Fail: Financial Contagion and Systemic Risk In Network Model of CDS and Other Credit Enhancement Obligations of US Banks," Working Papers 033, COMISEF.
    5. Sheri M Markose, 2013. "Systemic risk analytics: A data-driven multi-agent financial network (MAFN) approach," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 14(3-4), pages 285-305, July.
    6. David Goldbaum, 2009. "Follow the Leader: Steady State Analysis of a Dynamic Social Network," Working Paper Series 158, Finance Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney.
    7. Sheri M. Markose, 2012. "Systemic Risk from Global Financial Derivatives; A Network Analysis of Contagion and Its Mitigation with Super-Spreader Tax," IMF Working Papers 12/282, International Monetary Fund.
    8. repec:spr:comaot:v:23:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s10588-016-9224-2 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. AJ Bostian & David Goldbaum, 2016. "Emergent Coordination among Competitors," Working Paper Series 36, Economics Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney.

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