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Physician Resource Planning in Canada: The Need for a Stronger Behavioural Foundation

  • Sung-Hee Jeon
  • Jeremiah Hurley

An effective solution to the problem of access to physician services in Canada must extend beyond an over-exclusive focus on the number of providers to consider the behaviour of physicians in greater depth. The amount of labour and associated services supplied by physicians depends importantly on their attitudes regarding work, on practice and non-practice income opportunities, and on the policy environment in which they practise. Hence, the amount of labour supplied by a given stock of physicians can change over time. Only by considering the full range of factors that affect the labour supply of physicians can we effectively plan for physician resources.

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.3138/cpp.36.3.359
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Article provided by University of Toronto Press in its journal Canadian Public Policy.

Volume (Year): 36 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 359-375

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Handle: RePEc:cpp:issued:v:36:y:2010:i:3:p:359-375
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